gums,
My pleasure: I enjoyed your post and the two responses I referred to, and await any comments on A330 dynamic stability (or possible lack of). Think you meant "killing" time, rather than "buying" it? We better not hold our breath.
Lonewolf 50,
You inferred correctly. This was discussed on a previous AF447 thread last year. I don't know of any airliner that sports an AoA gauge in the cockpit in normal service, although AoA sensors have been the norm since the 1960s. Here are some airliners originating in the 1960s, 70s and 80s: listed roughly in order of entry into service.
(1) B707 (-320): No AoA sensors as such. Twin stick shaker and nudger system toggled by two lift transducer vanes, one under each wing leading-edge.
(2) VC10 (T-tail & rear-mounted engines): Two AoA sensors (non-mechanical) for the stall-protection system, which sequentially provided (a) pre-stall engine-ignition, (b) stick shaker, (c) stall-ident (stick-pusher). Bolt-on AoA sensor with cockpit gauge fitted only for air tests of the system.
(3) BAC 1-11 (T-tail & rear-mounted engines): similar to VC10, but conventional (mechanical-vane) AoA probes.
(4) DC10 (-30): Two AoA probes for stick shakers and automatic slat-extension.
(5) A310: Three AoA probes – 2 for the twin stick-shakers and slat-retraction inhibition; the 3rd to supply the two FACs, which calculate limit and manoeuvre speeds for display on the PFD-ASIs.
(6) A320: Three AoA probes supplying data to three ADIRUs (for the FBW computers) and two FACs. A value of AoA may be available (with prior notice) on the F/O's MCDU in AIDS mode, but still no usable cockpit indicator.
With the exception of the B707, they all seem to have the capability of providing useful AoA data. Certainly the A310 and A320 could, and that means also the A330/340 and A380. The absence of AoA indicators implies a policy decision by manufacturers and regulators. One assumes they have had good reason to believe that they are unnecessary and/or counter-productive in an air-transport cockpit, most of whose pilots (myself included) have never trained on AoA indicators. It will be interesting to see if this is in any way pertinent to the downfall of AF447.
You and bearfoil are right to point out that flying pitch/thrust alone could be problematical as a method of recovery from an upset, even one which has not taken the aircraft near the edge of its flight envelope, and particularly if you were caught unawares. Recovery is likely to be a slow process, possibly accompanied by compelling speed warnings of one kind or the other.