Interesting link Navaleye.
A senior navy source told The News: ‘The Harriers have only been mothballed so they could be brought back out to fly at any time. Until you crush something, it can be used.
Am I a particularly naughty boy for wondering if that also applies to old Sea Harriers in storage? Still, the GR9 can do all sorts of things, including limited air defence (
see the reference to remarks by MM here on GR9 supported by Sea King ASaCs/AWACS/shipboard fighter controllers).
Clearly GR9/AIM-9L is inferior to FA2/AMRAAM. I don’t discount that. Likewise, GR9 would not be credible against a modern fighter/active missile mix in many cases. However, you stated that GR9 had ‘no offensive anti air [sic] capability’. As someone with just a few thousand hours of AWACS experience (including flying in support of CVS and on several SKASaC sorties) I can tell you that you are incorrect.
The GR9 is slightly slower than the FA2 yes. However, it has significantly greater endurance and manoeuvrability.
Even without a radar, a GR9 with AIM-9L benefitting from SKASaC support would be as capable as a 1982 FRS1 sans AEW. Why? Firstly, the FRS1 Blue Fox radar was pulse only and therefore had extremely limited capability overland or against a high sea state (that’s why the PD Blue Vixen was developed). The majority of engagements in 1982 were ship controlled into the visual or pure visual pick ups. Meanwhile, in the Falklands we needed to keep DCA CAPs airborne due to the lack of AEW. FRS1 also seemed to do relatively well against supersonic capable Mirage III and Daggers.
With SKASaC providing wide area AEW overland and in all sea states (PD radar), GR9 could be maintained on deck alert and provide an AD capability at least on a par, if not superior to FRS1 sans AEW. When scrambled, SKASaC support would largely overcome the GR9 lead nose. Moreover, GR9 has a very nice EO/IR, defensive aids and RHWR capability, all of which were lacking from Sea Harrier (FRS1 or FA2). I’m not quite sure how you work out GR9 is limited to daylight VFR intercepts. I’ve personally controlled GR9s conducting night time NVG PIs and have seen GR7s kill F-16s, FA-18Cs, Mirage 2000 and Tornado F3s at night on exercise.
This was originally posted on ARRSE -
here. The
Auriga deployment of 2010 featured the
Ark Royal based Harrier GR9s doing air to air work against Hornets, both in self defence whilst doing ground attack and in air defence of the task group - directed on to the target by the ASaCS Sea King and shipborne fighter controllers.
I still think my idea of getting a dozen or so AV8B+s (Harriers with radar) in exchange for our GR9s and continuing to make
Illustrious (until 2014) and
Queen Elizabeth thereafter available for continued USMC Harrier embarkations is a winner!
Anyway, here are some old threads that also discussed these issues:
RN Fixed Wing future?
Head of Royal Navy threatens resignation over push to scrap Harriers
Harrier dispute between Navy and RAF chiefs sees Army 'marriage counsellor' called in
When I wrote an angry letter soon after the SDSR, I mentioned all the different people involved in safe flying operations aboard the carrier. Thus far, I resisted the urge to copy letters word for word, however, here is what I said with respect to skills:
If the Royal Navy has no capacity to operate fixed wing aircraft at sea for a decade, then all the skills that are needed will be lost. It is generally reckoned that building these skills up from being non existent to the level we currently have would take approximately ten years – maybe longer. Of course, the pilots can be sent to work with the US Navy or someone else, to build up experience of carrier operations. However, operating fixed wing aircraft (and helicopters to a certain extent) is a whole ship activity. It does not only involve the aircrew and flight deck personnel, but virtually everyone. There is no way we can send hundreds of sailors to work in American carriers, and most of these specialist skills need to be maintained by constant practice. Many are carrier specific.
On the flight deck, aircraft handlers need to be able to speedily and safely move aircraft around the flight deck, both by giving visual cues to pilots and by using vehicles. They also need to be able to deal with any fires or other incidents that might occur. The RN School of Flight Deck Operations at RNAS Culdrose has a dummy deck, dubbed HMS Siskin, where aircraft handlers learn their trade. Real aircraft, including a number of retired Sea Harriers, are used and move under their own power to simulate a carrier deck. However, they cannot simulate the movement of a ship at sea in variable sea conditions, pitching and rolling. Nor can they simulate things such the carrier increasing speed to launch aircraft and the sudden wind over the deck. Getting experience of these things and building experience and confidence requires people to spend time at sea working with aircraft for real. This is a key skill area that will decline very rapidly if we have no flying from carriers.
Other personnel may also need to work on the flight deck, amongst the aircraft. These include the people who maintain the aircraft, and those who fuel and arm them. They too need experience of doing it for real.
Beyond the flight deck, lots of other personnel in different parts of the ship are involved. These include the Navigating Officer and the Officer of the Watch and his/her team on the bridge, who must ensure that the ship is on the right heading for flying operations. The Commander (Air) and his team are responsible for running aviation activities. The marine engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre are responsible for increasing the speed of the carrier’s engines when needed for launching aircraft, they also carry out adjustments to things such as the ship’s trim, so as to maintain a level deck for flying. There are various sensors, communications systems and landing aids that need to be maintained and operated. All of these are things that demand time spent practising at sea.
Air Traffic Control is of critical importance, as are others who are involved in airspace management. A carrier is unlike any airfield in that she moves. Land based ATC cannot provide the same experience. Her command team must also consider the constraints put on her movements by the maritime environment, by her escorts, and by the need to be aware of the existence of things such as merchant shipping or fishing boats. The aircrew that fly from the deck also need to have an understanding of all these issues. They must also understand how they fit in with the rest of the ship and task group. Finally, no carrier operations mean that in ten years time, there will be no senior naval officers with experience or understanding of these complex issues.
Most of these things cannot be taught on a dummy deck, or in a simulator, but need developing by real flying aboard real decks. The RN has been doing this for many decades, and the experience and expertise, much of it won at great cost, handed down. It seems unlikely that the body of experience would survive a ten year gap of non use. Interestingly, young officers entering the training pipeline to become pilots or observers have been told that to go from scratch to the level of expertise we currently have would take ten years – this is based on the experience of others Navies like those of Spain and Italy who have gained carriers more recently than us.
Some of my comments here are based on what I was fortunate to witness aboard HMS Illustrious in late 2007. Although I had a pretty good idea of what to expect, the number of different parts of ship involved in maintaining safe and effective flying operations took me by surprise. The teamwork was impressive. If a mere [me - a Reservist junior rate] can see this, why does the review turn a blind eye? Whilst in the dinner queue one evening I looked in a magazine I found loafing, there was an article in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) commented on the danger of future Fleet Air Arm personnel becoming unfamiliar with the shipboard environment and deck operations. My path has crossed with aviation connected personnel at other times, and they have all expressed similar views.
I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
The skills issue was also mentioned on the
Sea Jet and
Future Carrier threads.
Now back to Libya. It really does seem that we may be putting both hands in the Libyan mangle.
Royal Navy Ships Sail To Join Cougar 11
The largest warship in the Royal Navy, HMS Ocean is carrying a mix of support helicopters, Apache attack helicopters and landing craft. These enable her to land Royal Marines, their vehicles and equipment and sustain them as they undertake exercises across the region.
Also -
HMS Aibion Plays TAG
Interesting times ahead. Can anyone else sense that our amphibious forces are about to be sent to Libya?
We can't put boots on the ground in Libya – but what about fins?
For this reason, it seems sensible that the UK is continuing with its Cougar amphibious deployment to the Mediterranean, comprising HMS Albion, HMS Ocean, RFA Cardigan Bay and HMS Sutherland, together with elements of 40 Commando Royal Marines. Ostensibly, they will conduct littoral operations off Cyprus. But with their ability to provide more imaginative solutions to the crisis, their deployment might be an indication of the way ahead. Although boots on the ground might be a step too far, "fins" on the ground, able to deter and prevent serious attacks on civilians before returning to their ships, might prove acceptable – and the low-footprint approach would get around any sense of them being an occupying force.
But even while we do our best to bring the Libyan mission to a speedy and successful conclusion, we must consider the broader implications. The very deployment of the Cougar force recognises that the Mediterranean is likely to be the source of political, economic and demographic challenges for some time to come. Over the next decade, a confusing array of demographic, climatic and societal pressures will severely challenge the political and economic realities with which Europeans have been comfortable for the past 60 years or so.
One of the most important and pressing issues is for European nations, both collectively and individually, to determine and implement a strategy for the region that will deliver security, stability and prosperity. But they will also need to maintain credible, effective and balanced military forces that are agile and powerful enough to deal with a broad range of crises: war does not come cheap, and nor, for that matter, does peace.
In this sense, Libya is both a laboratory and a test case. So far, it has proved that Europe on its own lacks the cohesion and military resources to undertake even a modest coercive campaign, on its own doorstep, without the support of the United States. It seems clear that a truly strategic reassessment is long overdue. In other words, someone needs to take charge.