JD-EE;
After the crew acknowledged the SELCAL check, only a few seconds had elapsed when ATLANTICO requested their TASIL estimate but the crew did not respond.
I don't think this in itself is an indication of "trouble" at that moment, anyway (but I think it began to unfold shortly after and well before 0210).
After the P2 thanked ATLANTICO for the check, I think the P2, (who I believe was the F/O, with the RP as P1) pushed the HF radio button down, turning off the volume to the #1HF before hearing ATLANTICO's request. The request was necessary because TASIL is the FIR boundary and AF447 did not provide ATLANTICO with the TASIL estimate on first contact, which is when it's normally done. It happens and it's no big deal. And turning off the volume to get rid of the HF static noise is also normal. That's what SELCAL is for. Yet while ATLANTICO verbally requested the estimate three times, the SELCAL was never used to call the crew back.
I think AF459's experience is germane. AF459 was "37 minutes" later at ORARO than AF447. I think the phrase "at the level of" is a translation for "abeam" ORARO, as they were on a wx deviation (east of track) at that point.
The information on page 68 of the first BEA Report discusses AF459's experience with weather deviation and what they saw on the radar and what the radar settings were, such as antenna tilt, varying the gain from MAX to CAL, and which in my view were exactly correct. they were about 160nm away from the weather which is described as a "vast squall line".
The animation of the tracks of all relevant aircraft is interesting - one can see AF459's deviation while AF447 neither communicated nor deviated, (as you say), yet they must have seen the same radar returns as AF459.
It's why the CVR is as important to recover as the SSFDR.