Speaking of AoA, I finally found something I think was raised in previous discussions (search did me no good in finding the thread)
7 July 2010 (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:
Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA-2010-0675; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-061-AD] RIN 2120-AA64
During Airbus Final Assembly Line reception flight tests, AoA data from two different aeroplanes were found inaccurate. Inaccuracy was confirmed by flight data analysis.
Investigation conducted by Thales on the removed probes revealed oil residue between the stator and the rotor parts of the AoA vane position resolvers. This oil residue was due to incorrect cleaning of the machining oil during the manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in cruise) causing lag of AoA vane movement.
Such condition could lead to discrepant AoA measurement. If not corrected, and if two or three AoA probes were simultaneously affected and provided wrong indications of the AoA to a similar extent, it could lead to a late activation of the angle of attack protection, which in combination with flight at high angle of attack would constitute an unsafe condition.
Therefore, this [European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)] AD requires a one time inspection of the Thales Avionics AoA probe P/N C16291AA in order to identify the suspect parts and to remove them from service.
That's a lot of if, however as this bulletin was issued in 2010, it may be that the AF 447 mishap was related to discovering discrepancies.
And it may also be unrelated. I note that it would take multiple failures, and multiple probes well past manufacture date, and in service, having this problem all at once for it to have influenced AF 447.