Dan, no, I will not zip much of anything, thanks so much for asking.
EDIT: Upon further review, I was rude to you for no reason, and for that I apologize, Dan. Won't do it again.
If you take what he writes at face value, then I'll repeat my advice to use critical thinking. Beyond that, read the
Pentagon Paradox and tell me why we still fly the F-18. We do, despite a veritable Greek Chorus of sniping and complaining about both the aircraft and the program when it was in similar stages to the V-22. (I'll leave to those who flew it to explain how to screw up the Vector Grid in the Coral Sea Battlegroup (86) thanks to F-18's comparatively short legs ... )
The decision to continue with V-22 program has been reviewed and reaffirmed frequently since the program's inception. When you consider which states, and which senators, and which congressmen had a stake in where high priced defense contracts were to arrive, you may find an even more worthwhile context for the actual decisions taken.
What are the alternatives, Dan? Were you around for those decisions?
Take for example the Blackhawk alternative (which does not hold a squad if you are the Marines). Consider the deck multiple of a CH-46 on an amphib, to get 25 Marines from point A to point B. Your Blackhawk gets 11 there, so you have to use 2.2 Blackhawks to replace 1 CH-46. You also have to house more pilots and crew to fly said Blackhawks. If you operate on an amphib where space is at a premium, that is an easily defeated option. It was doubtless defeated for that and other reasons.
Take the All CH-53E alternative. (Which I personally thought was a better idea, based on how it would fit into the infamous 90's era Helo Master Plan). Depending on configuration, you might be able to carry 37 Marines (don't know if the Marines typically used "50+ with centerline seats installed") which you balance against the deck multiple on an amphib and see if you come out ahead. I suspect there were pros and cons considered for that option within the USMC, but you still run into the speed limitation of rotary wing aircraft. And at that time in the program, the belief was that the technical issues (and associated risks) were solvable in the near term.
But politically, <--- and that's very important -- if you had gone with the all 53 option, that would move the manufacture of Marine helicopters out of PA and into CT ... or AL ... so you get a grand battle that has little to nothing to do with aerodynamics, payload, or mission effectiveness, or even unit cost.
With Boeing in the mix in the V-22, their influence on "where and what" becomes a non-trivial program approval factor ... as does the location in Texas of the proposed production facility, in Amarillo (can't recall when that became final, sometime in the 90's).
That has little to nothing to do with cost, mission effectiveness, airworthiness, or mods and options (guns or no guns?) and everything to do with how you actually get your hands on a new aircraft: it requires dancing the Congressional dance.
When the GAO puts a costs on that political skullduggery -- it creates a real cost -- I'll be less cynical when reading their reports and assessments of weapons acquisition programs. For journalists with axes to grind, the cynicism remains.
From the GAO report:
A month after the first flight, the Secretary of Defense stopped requesting funds for the program due to affordability concerns. In December 1989, the Department of Defense (DOD) directed the Navy to terminate all V-22 contracts because, according to DOD, the V-22 was not affordable when compared to helicopter alternatives, and production ceased. Congress disagreed with this decision, however, and continued to fund the project. In October of 1992 the Navy ordered development to continue and awarded a contract to a Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Helicopters joint venture to begin producing production-representative aircraft.
Between 1990 and LRIP, the "alternatives" were indeed considered, and abandoned. I'll leave to you, the reader, to figure out why.
Cheers