Of course, since carrier strike is part of long term defence strategy, you
could argue about whether the loss of Harrier and not embarking jets aboard ship for a decade is in any way compatible with that goal - unless you are the Government. I see nobody commented on the report that the SDSR had been distorted by the PM (not good with practical things or checking facts) at the 11th hour for political reasons.
There was a letter in the
Times today regarding defence. Not a subscriber to the website so no link or quotes.
Here is a damning paper by Andrew Dorman:
Lessons from Libya
The government seems to have forgotten its own working assumptions with David Cameron leading calls for a no-fly zone and subsequently committing British forces to support the no-fly zone and engage in attacks on Libyan ground forces.
The initial service-led evacuation of entitled personnel raised questions about the cuts announced in the SDSR. The use of HMS Cumberland on its way back to Britain for decommissioning was a little embarrassing. Added to this was the problem of generating ancient Tristar aircraft (the replacement is still not in service whilst the VC-10s are no longer deemed safe to carry passengers). This led to chaotic attempts at leasing civilian aircraft and the eventual use of Hercules aircraft (being retired early) to pick up personnel from bases in the Libyan desert.
The situation might have been worse if it had occurred a few months later. Part of the problem the government had was the lack of a picture of what was going on. The planned 25 per cent cut to the FCO budget must seem a little hasty now. In terms of military capability, the SDSR planned to significant downgrade Britain’s ability to generate information; the Nimrod R1 force of spy planes were due to leave service at the end of March 2011 with their replacements not due into service until 2014, i.e. a three year gap in capability. (As operations continue, the MoD is hoping to keep one of these aircraft going for three more months.)
Moreover, the decision to retire the four Type-22 Batch 3 frigates was not just a reduction in the size of the surface fleet, it also meant that their enhanced information gathering capability and command and control facilities would be lost without replacement*.
The escalation of Britain’s commitment from an evacuation operation to the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 further highlighted problems with the SDSR.
Unlike France, Italy or the United States, the UK has been unable to deploy an aircraft carrier to the Mediterranean. Its contribution to the no-fly zone would at best have been limited. The Royal Navy lost its Sea Harrier air defence capability in 2006 when the previous Labour government took the Sea Harrier force out of service (something that those who argued for its retention to protect the Falkland Islands forget).
However, the Navy had been equipped with the Harrier ground-attack aircraft and thus would have been able to provide a more reactive response to the situation on the ground than that provided by aircraft based in Sicily. It would also have provided the combat search and rescue capability for aircrew whose aircraft were lost over Libya.
Not being able to make a major contribution to a no fly zone is not the same as having no air defence capability - and remember MM (RAF ISTAR expert) has highlighted possible GR9 air defence roles.
*A CVS has even better intelligence gathering and command/control facilities.
As it is, the British government is dependent on this being provided by the United States. Interestingly, although the Harriers have been withdrawn from service they have not been scrapped, unlike the Nimrod MRA4s.
There is therefore the potential to return these aircraft to service aboard the UK’s remaining aircraft carrier and it is clear that the political symbolism of aircraft carriers remains significant.
MOD still owns a few Sea Harriers too - not just at Culdrose at the dummy deck but also elsewhere, and resisted Indian attempts to buy some in 2009.
This is worth a read, too.