BEags
Although the value of the Harrier GR9 in enforcing a no fly zone may be limited, it could do ground attack and reece and augment other aircraft types. Harriers are flying from American and Italian decks.
In a different theatre, as pointed out by MM and others, the GR9 could perform an air defence role if aided by an ISTAR asset such as ASaCs Sea King or E3 Sentry, and/or shipborne radars and fighter controllers. If nothing else, it would allow visual identification of suspicious aircraft in situations in which ROE is tight for shipborne weapons, as well as giving the enemy MiG drivers something to thing about.
Despite the lack of organic airpower, we may be commiting amphibious and ground forces to Libya. Brown trousers time.
One of the lessons from Libya is that even non Government players can have aircraft - there was a story a couple of days ago about a rebel MiG 23 and a rebel attack helicopter.
As for the future carriers - they are not in service yet, and without maintaining the skills needed for running a carrier we will have big problems.
FB
Not sure what you mean by the RN "taking on the RAF's role". Operating weapon systems from ships (yes, that includes aircraft) is a Navy role, no?
TTH
I think Sharkey Ward would be more than happy for the mighty Sea Harrier to be resurrected. But surely all Harriers and Sea Harriers became RAF assets under Joint Force Harrier? As for the budget having flex - well there are rumours of some axed assets being reprieved. Each of the four Type 22 frigates that got the SDSR chop have a running cost of something like £32 million per year - additionally they need crews and three out of four would need refits and upgrades. I suspect that it would be cheaper to retain some Harriers than the four T22s.
Biggus
So don't expect too much, it can only lead to disappointment!
Story of my life.
Anyway, after receiving the letter from the MinAF (also my MP) over this matter, I sent a quick e-mail to his researcher. My points were that it is good to see that they are still looking into how to regenerate skills for CVF. I also noted that with
Illustrious in service until 2014, and then
Queen Elizabeth entering service soon after, we would have a platform capable of embarking fixed wing aircraft throughout this decade and could thus embark American, Italian, or Spanish Harriers to maintain the skills mentioned above. I also repeated hearing of the RNR Harrier proposal, and suggested that having a smaller number of aircraft doing less flying, with less personnel. I also suggested that the fixed costs might be less than fixed due to less upgrades being needed, base closures being unaffected as the aircraft were to be moved to Yeovilton, possible use of Reservist simulator instructors, etc.
I also noted that at the time the Prime Minister was talking about a Libyan no fly zone, and commented that there are no nearby land bases, and that carrier based aircraft would be useful. I also commented on the changes sweeping through the Middle East and asked if our defence policy was on the wrong side of history.
Yesterday - a reply arrived. After thanking me, he said that:
The retention of
Illustrious does mean we will have one deck capable of embarking fixed wing aircraft. Embarking foreign Harriers would maintain skills. However, the switch to F35C and Cats/Traps (my words) means that exchanges with the US Navy and the French Navy will be more useful in using Cats and Traps, and large carrier operations. [But what about....see above.]
Note that he
didn't say no embarkation of AV8B would ever take place. I am sure that one year (2007) either Spain or Italy asked us to embark their Harriers aboard
Illustrious as their carrier was broken.
Then he said that the idea of a smaller Harrier force operated by Reservists had been looked at but dismissed on grounds of not being cost effective.
He commented that Italy and Spain retain smaller Harrier fleets partly by having a Memorandum of Understanding with other nations (the US?) to reduce costs. He also said that base closures do not play are part in these decisions/savings (Cottesmore is to be retained) and the assumptions about contractual liabilities were not wrong.
He commented that financial considerations strongly influenced the decisions, and apologised for the disappointing reply. Well, to be honest, I didn't really expect a sudden U turn. Ministerial collective responsibility and all that.
From the
Telegraph today:
Rethinking defence cuts: the more things change, the more they stay the same…
Then there’s the question of longer-term cuts. As we and others report this morning, David Cameron is taking a close look at the defence review’s cuts, and wondering whether some of them can and should be eased. The PM’s motives here are twofold. Strategically, he’s aware that the Arab Spring presents Britain with no end of challenges.
Everyone involved, including, I suspect, the PM, was a little surprised at how quickly the Libyan crisis blew up, and how quickly Britain got involved militarily. Given these uncertain times, who’d want to rule out another similar crisis elsewhere? It’s hardly impossible to imagine regime collapse in Yemen leading to calls for a Western intervention to prevent the country becoming even more of an al-Qaeda haven than it is now. Leaving aside the question of political will, does Britain now have the spare military capability take part in any such intervention? And will it have that capability in six months’ time?
Politically, the PM is growing ever more aware of how badly defence cuts go down. It’s no secret that he was dismayed by the reaction to this week’s military redundancies, especially in The Sun. He knows that more is to come. He would not be human if he did not want to at least soften the blows that will inevitably rain down on him.
Later...
So any reversal on cuts would have to be balanced with savings elsewhere. In other words, new cuts. And where would those cuts fall? Well, as analysts including Andrew Dorman point out, the Army would have to be prime candidate. Largely shielded from cuts in the SDSR, surely the Army could lose a few more thousand posts to free up some cash for the RAF and Navy? For much of the SDSR process, that was the MoD’s plan, but the Army cuts were scaled back by the PM.
That last-minute decision skewed the rest of the review and its outcomes, with negative consequences for the other services that are still becoming clear. Awareness of that problem is spreading across Whitehall.
Hence the Harrier chop?
Indeed, the annoyingly well-informed Alex Barker of the FT reports today that even the generals now accept that argument. But Mr Cameron, wary of more bad headlines about sacking Our Boys while they fight in Afghanistan, has said No.
Ah the joys of having a
PR man as national leader...
So, at the same time as signalling he’d like to soften the defence cuts, the PM is limiting the MoD’s room for manoeuvre on the issue. Liam Fox and his friends would not be human if they didn’t feel a certain frustration here.
Dr Fox isn't the only one.
So, to summarize, we have a Downing Street machine that wants to avoid bad headlines on defence but is squeamish about radical alternatives, a Treasury that doesn’t want to give an inch, and an MoD that feels that neither of them really understand the real state of defence and what’s possible and what’s not. The result is last-minute compromise deals that mean short-term delays in spending, clever accounting wheezes to understate liabilities, and pressure for politically-expedient climbdowns on cuts — all of which can only increase long-term costs.
If only David Davis had won the Tory leadership.
I wonder if politicians or their staffs read PPRuNe
et al?