The overriding ADF force deployment priority now seems for sealift, but equipped troop weight and air-portability characteristics of hardware impact significantly on airlift capabilities, both at the sharp end of war-fighting and for regional quick reaction requirements.
Back in Vietnam War days, good infantry commanders kept their troops 'light', I think averaging around 220 pounds just carrying a smallish pack in addition to their other essential kit. When operating with cavalry in direct support, provision of water in particular was a lessened weight problem. If no tracks supporting due to terrain or whatever, the Iroquois were used very well for 1ATF elements routine maintenance demands (hash and trash in US parlance) including water, clothing, rations, etcetera - providing hot meals to the infanteers after a hard day when they were drenched and shivering gave all of the 9SQN aircrew a buzz.
I raise this aspect because the much heavier weights being quoted impact significantly on what fixed and rotary wing might notionally carry. For example, a theoretical infantry squad/section of 10 'light' troops at 220 pounds would require 2,220 pounds of payload availability whereas maybe 3,000 pounds or more would be necessary for heavily encumbered troops with fuel loading perhaps being restricted for some aircraft types. Cabin space is of course also affected by bulkiness. So, all of the idealism regarding necessity for utility helos in particular to carry 10 troops might not be achievable; although I cannot recall prior involvement with any Australian infantry outfit where sections were more than 6 or 7 strong. Having pursued disability pensions for Army guys who have suffered serious musculo-skeletal injuries from being physically overloaded also makes me wonder re the wisdom of present day equipping of ground-pounders.
But back to APCs. See this link regarding another big hardware modification screw-up:
Australia’s M113 APC Family Upgrades . It seems that stretching of the M113 hull by about 0.67 metres was ill-conceived and the question arises what impact might this now have on numbers of vehicles that can be airlifted in C-130 and C-17?
Reacher; I beg to differ re your post #100.
The M113 did a fantastic job in Vietnam ops but Australian cavalry units have been much under-credited because they operated a lot in direct support of other elements and cav unit histories became sparse. A few were lost/damaged by IEDs and RPGs but a pretty low loss rate considering the magnitude of their operations. The threat (risk) from higher technology weaponry such as EFPs (Explosively Formed Penetrators) or whatever depends on the availability and intensity of such armaments; like MANPADS for instance which have really not substantially dominated battlefields.
The pretty light M113 has essential off-road capabilities for wet tropics operations and is air-transportable, although how now affected by modifications is unknown. But upgrade of 431 vehicles for the ADF is still in train, so presumably they would not just be stored because the Canberra lot might be fearful of some losses and casualties. If committed to military operations at any time, best use has to be made of assets in service.