On the subject, the Ethiopian 737 prang at Beirut is interesting:
http://www.lebcaa.com/pdfs/Investiga...s%20Report.pdf
Instruments meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and the flight was on an instrument flight plan. The accident occurred at night in dark lighting conditions with reported isolated cumulonimbus clouds and thunderstorms in the area.
ET 409 was initially cleared by ATC on a LATEB 1 D SID from Runway 21. Just before take-off, ATC changed the clearance to an “immediate right turn direct Chekka” .
After take-off ATC instructed ET 409 to turn right on a heading of 315° and change to Control 119.3. ET 409 acknowledged the clearance and continued right turn. ATC instructed ET 409 to turn left heading 270°. ET-409 acknowledged.
The Flight continued left turn to heading 270° after acknowledgment but did not maintain that heading. The aircraft continued on southerly track making a sharp left turn until it disappeared from the radar screen and crashed into the Mediterranean Sea at 00:41:30 around 6 NM South West of BRHIA and all occupants were fatally injured.
The FO had 673 hrs total and was a "cadet":
According to records provided by ET, the First Officer graduated from Ethiopian Aviation Academy on 15 January 2009 and was transferred to the ET Flight Operations Division on 16 January 2009. His initial operation training consisted in part of 80 hours course in Jet Conversion, 60 hours of Basic Instrument Flying (Simulator) completed on 16 March 2009 and Adverse Weather Upset Recovery training done on 12 March 2009. He completed company training on B737-700/800 consisting of 120 hours of ground school, 60 hours of Simulator, 1 hour of base training and 64 hours of route training
Inexperienced captain on jets (had a few thousand bug-smasher, though) and, I suspect, "automation dependent" FO. Note they both did Upset training.
The actual crash sequence is on page 10.
Poor training, auto-dependency and low experience.