5th C-17 for RAAF

[Bushranger 71]

Hi 500N; re your post #78. The point I keep trying to make here is the need for suitable fixed wing airlift capacity to swiftly deploy/redeploy modest size (company group) forces cost-effectively and as close as practicable to prospective scenes of action throughout the neighbouring archipelago, limiting the amount of in-theatre secondary transportation necessary. In other words; timely and cost-effective operations.

Amphibious support ships of whatever class are more of a somewhat sluggish though valuable follow-up capability and can of course provide a range of helo services in particular for in theatre support.

I have been jousting re the submarine requirement in another forum and some extracts perhaps worth repeating here.

DWP2009 embraces the following bits re Australian Defence Policy:

'...Central to this policy would be a capacity and willingness on Australia's part to employ military power when required to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia without relying on foreign combat or combat support forces.

In terms of military strategy, it means the ability to conduct independent military operations in the defence of Australia by way of controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia, and denying an adversary the ability to operate, without disruption, in our immediate neighbourhood, to the extent required to ensure the security of our territory and people'...

Deterrence of interference with regional trade corridors is realistic; but defeat of armed attack on Australia is militarily impractical. The primary emphasis in foregoing policy is on capabilities for regional operations and not for wandering the world, although governments might choose to also engage in international combined operations, if Australia has suitable capacity. But the taxpayer rightly deserves that adequate and credible military capabilities for regional operations be continually maintained.

Hoping not to get too much thread drift here, but methinks Australian defence capabilities planning got skewed in the aftermath of East Timor intervention. For what its worth, the 'Planning and Selection' detail on this Wikipedia link Canberra class landing helicopter dock - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia illustrates how an arguable over-emphasis on sealift capacity has been allowed to override adequate fixed wing airlift considerations. What seemed a logical requirement for some smallish replacement amphibious support ships with about 6 helicopters embarked (perhaps something akin to the beaut Chinese Type 071 LPD outlined on this link: India Defence Update: Article) somehow morphed into aircraft carriers capable of embarking between 16 and 24 helicopters.

There still seems a notion among defence planners that there must be helo capacity for so-called combat air assault which was largely discredited as a concept of operations during the Vietnam War, albeit that some nations still apparently believe LPH style warships are a worthwhile military asset. No credible military commander would entertain assaulting any military objective considering the inevitable scale of casualties and likely hardware losses, so sensible amphibious concepts are more ship to shore shuttling of troops and gear plus providing offshore basing for logistic and other support.

Henceforth, the ADF will not have the most suitable balance of military transportation capabilities for regional operations in my view, although what is being/will be introduced must of course be made workable. But fixed wing airlift capacity warrants urgent reconsideration, before C-130 resources in particular degrade further.