There seems a realisation in some quarters that Australian military force deployments are more likely to bend toward company group scale requirements than larger brigade or battalion group expeditionary forces. And, like it or not, military chiefs will have to become more accountable for the operating costs of mounting operations.
Larger scale deployments to ports and airheads require significant overheads in cargo handling gear and provision of in theatre secondary transportation, so the desirable capability for swift deployment is direct airland into multiple rudimentary airfields around our regional area of military interest.
The MRTT may be suited for operations into some airheads, but my sombre view is the JSF/Wedgetail/MRTT constellation will collectively prove another hugely costly debacle, although let's not digress.
More C-17s would be good and they can go to some places beyond airliner capable airheads, but not to all airfields that might take a C-130 for direct deployment closer to potential scenes of action. The C-130J has not been the quality aircraft like predecessor models with some former RAAF C-130A & E models refurbished by other nations and still operating worldwide. Australia's C-130H may have been flogged but would be quickly snapped up by other nations for refurbishment; so why not put them through a factory rebuild program rather than buy more of the still deficient C-130J?
C-27 and Chinook are principally intra-theatre capabilities for locations not accessible by C-17 or C-130. The question arises will the RAAF ever see the C-27, which I much doubt because the intended compounding increases in defence expenditure will simply be unaffordable and some roles will probably have to be shed by all 3 of the ADF arms. As some say, expansion of the Chinook fleet may be an alternative, but at what cost in additional numbers to provide an adequate force?
What might add some more substance to this interesting thread is detailing of operating costs per flying hour for C-17, C-130, MRTT, Chinook, Caribou and an estimate for C-27. For too long now, the Service Chiefs have got away with ignoring this aspect in force structures planning and conduct of operations.
The message re operating costs may soon be driven home when they are realized for Tiger, MRH90 and whatever is acquired for the so-called naval combat helicopter.