Sorry to reiterate, but this was NOT a service only involving the Isle of Man directly. The aircraft was positioned first thing in the morning from Aldegrove to Belfast City. An internal flight within UK airspace. Then it operated the Belfast City to Cork flight. An international flight between UK and Irish (an Independant Republic) airspace. This was however all with the EU. The regulators involved would therefore be Spain, for the AOC and aircraft operator. Isle of Man for the ticket seller Manx 2, the UK CAA for overseeing flights from UK airports, and Irish CAA as the destination airport authority, and perhaps EASA as a European umbrella. (I imagine that most of these bodies will have levied some sort of fee for their services and authorisations). Each of these bodies have mechanisms for inspecting the operations of airlines within their jurisdictions.
As an aside I was ramp checked in DUB last year by the Irish CAA under their SAFA scheme and found them polite, knowledgeable (about my company, UK carrier, and my aircraft, A320), and thorough over our doumentation, both personal and company. Their inspection included a good examination of the tech logs for CFD's and failures, followed by interrogating ECAM with the RCL button, with my permission, for any current system defects that might not have been written up.
The initial facts of the incident and crash are now known and accepted. The crew accepted clearances and vectors for a series of illegal approaches. The question of why they did it will take a lot longer, and may never be fully resolved. I use the terms "crew" and "they" deliberately as both crew members knew the actual weather conditions and would have had access to the minima required for the approaches. Any professional licence holder should be aware of the legal implications of flouting these. Without an autopilot fitted there would never be any question of the technical status of the aircraft. CatI only.
If this was an isolated case of one individual leading the other, (risky shift group decision making I think the CRM books call it), then the company needs to address this. If this was a company culture the crew inherited, then the regulators need to address it. The comparisons between this and the recent crash in Katowice might perhaps indicate this to be a larger problem than first appears.
I'm fortunate to fly for a responsible large operator with modern jet equipment. Well maintained and CatIIIb qualified at suitable airfields. However I started in GA with small operators, pistons, no autopilot and occaisional pressure from the CP to get in. I've been there in small outfits, and had to resist pressure to do silly things. I'm very glad I'm out of that environment.
A tragic occurence for all the families involved. It should never have happened.