I was dismayed by this decision, and on 21 October started to write a letter to my MP, who is also the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, over this issue. I am not going to copy the entire letter here, but initial points included:
-I was shocked, this does not appear to have been thought through
-The RN has been unfairly hit
-The review says we will not need carriers for a decade, and writes them off as a Cold War legacy, yet says we need Challenger and Tornado (despite the prediction of nothing happening), which were also designed during the Cold War
-RN morale has (reportedly) nose dived, even the First Sea Lord's message acknowledged the risks involved and the problems in regenerating carrier aviation in a decade's time
-The SDSR has been rushed
-What were serving personnel, future recruits, families, allies, and adversaries to make of it?
-Why did Dr Fox look so angry during the PM's announcement?
After a few comments about CVF, I then went on to talk about the Harrier, and its utility in recent operations, the support contracts signed for it, and the fact that it can do air defence to an extent, particularly if supported by Sea King ASaCs or similar, pointed out that the US Marines use theirs in Afghanistan, suggested the retention of a small number, and queried what would happen to the aircraft.
Then I compared HMS Ships Illustrious and Ocean, pointing out that the latter is in need of an extensive refit and was built on the cheap, as opposed to the faster and more robust Illustrious. I also pointed out that retaining illustrious would mean Harriers could been embarked, even if they are American, Italian, or Spanish ones.
I then outlined my concerns, including that future cuts are more likely to kill future naval aviation. I noted that post Sea Harrier having embarked Harriers has been rare whilst the force has been committed to Afghanistan, but we could have had we really needed to. However, if we scrape through a decade with no disasters, the Treasury will insist we do not need then.
Then the skills issue. I noted that lots of personnel are involved in flying operations, and we can't send then all on exchange. Not only are pilots involved but also aircraft handlers, maintainers and armourers, the Navigating Officer, the OOW and his/her team, the Commander (Air) and his team, Marine Engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre, the operators and maintainers of various sensors, communications systems, and landing aids, Air Traffic Control, the Command team, and finally senior Officers. Without fixed wing flying at sea, how will their skills be maintained?
I then repeated that these things need practising at sea and cannot be easily simulated. I noted that (according to a baby WAFU I sort of know) it is taught that it would taken ten years to get to our current level of expertise from scratch. I recalled seeing a period of flying aboard Illustrious in late 2007, when I was surprised by how many parts of ship were involved. I also noted reading a magazine in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) identified the danger of naval aviators becoming unfamiliar with HM Ships.
I then went on to point out that the major events of the pasty twenty years were mostly unpredicted, so surely the future will be too. I also pointed the contribution our carriers and aircraft made during the first Gulf War, Bosnia, stand-offs with Saddam Huessein, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the war on terror, the invasion of Iraq, and the Lebanon NEO in 2006.I made a passing mention of the persisting threat to Falklands, noting that Argentine Super Etendards still conduct flying training from US and Brazilian carriers and Argentina has amphibious ships on its shopping list, and the increased belligerence in both words and deeds such as incursions into Falklands waters. I noted that a task group with the Harrier GR9 (supported by Sea King ASaCS etc) would still be able to engage aircraft beyond the range of shipborne missiles, and noted the reece and attack (against maritime or ground targets) capabilities. I noted that it will take a few years before all six Type 45 destroyers are in service with Sea Viper, and that experience from 1982 shows that even the best equipped ships can experience computer failure or manoeuvring and blocking firing arcs.
I also noted that the reduction in frigate numbers will make it likely that the APT(S) role will be gapped from time to time, as it was when HMS Northumberland was retasked for counter piracy stuff in the Gulf of Aden in late 2008. [Funnily enough, HMS York, in her way the Falklands, was diverted last week because of the Libyan situation.] I also noted that SSN numbers will fall below seven later this decade - so having one down South will be less likely. I also pointed out the Falklands patrol vessel Clyde will need refitting in 2012, but we might not be able to relieve her with a River class OPV due to the security requirements of the Olympics. I suggested that retaining Illustrious and a small number of Harriers would increase our options should something happen, and would help deter any Argentine hotheads.
I then mentioned possible Yemeni [this was before the recent terror plots] and Somali scenarios, as well as other events in Africa or the Middle East. Lastly I noted that carriers and amphibious vessels are suitable for use as flagships, which may be important as the four Type 22 frigates getting axed have been used in this role.
I then said that I did not think anyone with professional experience of naval aviation would think you could pick up the baton after ten years of having no carrier operations, and pointedly asked if any naval aviation professionals had been consulted. I also noted that I had heard suggestions that a possible defence review outcome might be Reservists taking over capabilities not currently needed. I then suggested that retaining Illustrious would allow the embarkation of Harriers (even if not our own) and allow skills to be retain, and that retaining a small number of Harriers would enhance this and allow us to react to unforeseen crises. I then repeated that I consider that a ten year gap of having no fixed wing carrier operations is incompatible with the desire to operate carriers in the future.
After posting this letter on 25 October, I continued to pay attention to related news in the media. I also waited for any reply. By February, no replied had come, so I chased it up with an a-mail to my MP's researcher, and took the opportunity to make a few more points. These included the fact that the £700 million support contracts signed for the Harrier included cancellation clauses, that the Captain of Ark Royal alluded to a four year gap until Queen Elizabeth enters service, that the December announcement of details of surface fleet cuts included retaining Illustrious until 2014, therefore most of this decade we should be able to embark Harriers. I also noted that Ocean is getting a very extensive £100 million refit - and wondered what work might be involved, then I noted the story in the Telegraph about Reservists and Harriers:
Navy Chiefs' plan to save jump jets
A last-ditch attempt has been made by the Royal Navy to save Harriers from the axe, with a proposal to allow reservist pilots to fly them.
As the last flight of the jump jets takes place at RAF Cottesmore today a plan, said to be backed by the First Sea Lord, has been put forward to preserve a rump of 20 Harriers.
Navy chiefs have warned of an "unbridgeable skills gap" for pilots needed to fly the Joint Strike Fighter off the new aircraft carriers that will come into service in 2020 if carrier training is stopped. Without the ability to fly off carriers for the next 10 years, Navy pilots will lose the skill of landing on rolling decks in bad weather and deck crews will not get the practice they needed to safely launch and recover aircraft.
The decision to scrap the Harrier in favour of the RAF's Tornados in the strategic defence review infuriated the Navy.
But hopes of saving the Harrier, of which there are 65 serviceable aircraft in total, will be raised at a meeting of the defence board in January.
A proposal will be made to allow Royal Navy Reserve pilots to continue flying the planes at weekends from Yeovilton, Somerset.
Senior naval officers say the RAF is rushing to retire the Harriers to make the defence review decision a "fait accompli" before alternatives are put in place."
Then I said I though that the idea had merit, since RNR personnel include all Fleet Air Arm trades, who can be mobilised for operations or exercises as well as shorter periods. I suggested money could be saved by having less aircraft doing less flying, needing less spares and support, and less personnel - many of whom would not need paying 365 days a year. I noted that the cancellation clauses will mean the support cost will not be zero in any circumstances, and also that the base closures would be unaffected, I also mentioned the possible MOD use of Wittering where the simulator is, and the role of Reservists as simulator instructors.
This week, I received a reply, dated 28 February. It acknowledged my letter(s) and explained the Government position. It was dated 28 February, but may have had parts of the reply drafted prior to my chasing up e-mail. After thanking me for the letter and e-mail, he went on to explain the Government's position. Instead of copying and pasting the entire letter, I shall attempt to summarise it: Direct quotes are in bold italics.
In the light of the need for financial cuts, defence spending had to be cut. It came down to a decision between Harrier and Tornado due to the greater savings achieved by withdrawing a type entirely. As Tornado is in Afghanistan, it was preferred, although Harrier is capable and flexible and has served the nation well.
The decade long capability gap was accepted as Afghanistan is the priority. Since the number of operational Harriers was cut to 32 in 2009 (Torpy strikes again?) it would be unable to sustain Afghan deployments and carrier operations with decent capacity for unexpected events. However, in the long term we need to regenerate carrier capability as we cannot take for granted the continued availability of host nation support that would allow us to deploy air power where we might need to. After mentioning the decision to have one carrier in extended readiness and the decision to opt for the F35C instead of F35B, the paragraph ends in: We are now investigating the optimum means of delivering this outcome.
I argued very persuasively about the problems of maintaining and regenerating the demanding skills and experience needed to operate fixed wing aircraft at sea. These were put forward and discussed at length during the SDSR process (before or after the announcement, I wonder)? Further work is being undertaken on mitigating this risk, through, amongst other things*, a programme of international exchanges, and significant investment of time and effort in regenerating its capacity when the new carriers and Joint Strike Fighter enter service.
Then he mentioned Illustrious and Ocean. Naturally Ocean is preferred for the LPH role, with an equipment storage area and the ability to operate landing craft. She is due a refit in "about two years time", so Illustrious is being retained until 2014 so that one is always available at readiness for operations. Nothing to do with RN senior bods the need to continue to be able to embark jets, then?
The Falklands issue got mentioned, apparently the assessment is capability gap will not risk their security, and the Government is committed to their protection, by maintaining a capable sea, ground, and air presence to deter and defend.
It concludes that this is a point of departure, not the end of the line, with a path to 2020 and beyond with reviews every five years. 2010-2015 is about rebalancing our strategic direction, and 2015-2020 will be about regenerating the carrier capability which is the overall strategy.
* Could other things include embarking US/Italian/Spanish Harriers, or perhaps some Indian Sea Harriers - a response to the aid we give them? How about still trying to periodically embark and operate UK owned Harriers?
I guess the issue of unexpected events and strategic changes is too controversial to think or talk about?