CONF iture;
Originally Posted by CONF iture
Originally Posted by Goldfish85
the "Retard" call should continue until both are at or near idle and the volume should increase first to "RETARD"" then to "PULL THEM BOTH BACK, DUMMY"
PJ2, would you agree with that quote ?
No, not unconditionally. I think it is a response which parallels the right direction but should not be counted upon as a sole intervention.
First, I like very much what
Safetypee has posted above. Second, I have offered thoughts on this throughout the thread including notions expressing the view that "not closing the throttles at landing" may be the outcome of a cognitive process of "out-thinking the airplane" when in fact no reason exists to do so. By that I mean, a pilot may hesitate in doing something he believes may be irreversible and doesn't fully understand the results of his actions. Where I think the process can cause such confusion is in the FCOM and the MEL of the time, which could have been more clear about what to do with a thrust lever for which engine had a reverser locked out. I recall reading it when I had the MEL item and wondering, do I leave the TL in IDLE or bring both into reverse? It was later clarified and both are brought into reverse but that was not always the case.
Regardless, nothing untoward would have occurred in either selection but by definition (by the incidents), that was not the understanding. Either that is the case, or some event surprised the PF such that he was momentarily unable to act. I have seen that as well, in the data and that was the comment when discussed. It happens, but not often enough to design warnings and software to cater to all untoward rabbit trails.
Now, all kinds of impressions (masquerading as 'understanding) could and have occurred on this and other A320 issues, not without understandable reasons, I will add. But early in the game of learning the airplane, it must be emphasized and accepted that "it is just an airplane". In defence of this assessment I offer two observations, which are, not surprisingly, related to the SATA (and other) hard landing events being discussed on that thread:
1) Why would a pilot expect anything different to occur other than a thrust reduction when a thrust lever was pulled back to IDLE? Was the concern, "what will happen if I bring both into reverse?
What other"devils on the wall" were painted about this and other systems that have no basis in how the aircraft actually functions? Is this merely a training issue or is there something else going on at the cognitive level that requires an "intellectualizing" of the airplane which subtlely displaces the "gestalt" we often speak of in how we normally fly airplanes? (Does automation drive out "art" or can the two co-exist? What part does training have in preserving the "art" while enhancing understanding?)
2) As partial evidence for this view, I offer the Aigle Azur A321 hard landing incident which occurred on January 08, 2008. The handling pilot, a captain, had voiced discomfort with sitting in the right seat. At landing, despite three 'retard' calls, the thrust levers were kept in the CLB detent until touchdown at 600fpm. The aircraft bounced 7ft, the PF selected the TLs to IDLE and the spoilers began to deploy. The 2nd t/d was at 850fpm, 3.3g's. The report, in French, is available
here.
It is not a leap to envision the potential for a thrust lever of an engine which reverser has been locked out being kept in the CLB detent even after all the RETARD calls, as that is precisely what occurred here.
We will never know why, or what caused, in the sense of a cognitive "fixation" if I may call it that, the #2 thrust lever in the TAM cockpit to be left in its position while the other was dutifully retarded to idle. But the clues are available to know and to counter such human behaviours more effectively, and I do not believe, nor do I think that the present solution of "more" is the appropriate fix in terms of retard calls or whatever is to be conceived as the next counteractive measure to the next "cause", whatever it may be.
PJ2