May the experiences from DENY FLIGHT be of any value in relation to a possible NFZ operation in Libya? ROE, communication, decision-making?
An incident which might be of interest happened on this day 17 years ago:
On 28 February 94, four NATO fighters shot down four fixed-wing aircraft violating the UN "No-Fly" zone. NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft (NAEW) detected unknown tracks South of Banja Luka early that morning. Two NATO aircraft, U.S. Air Force F-16s, were vectored to the area and intercepted six GALEB/JASTREB aircraft. In accordance with the rules of engagement, two "land or exit the No-Fly Zone or be engaged" orders were issued which were ignored. While this was happening the violating aircraft dropped bombs. The NATO fighters engaged the planes, shooting down three of them. A second pair of NATO fighters, U.S. Air Force F-16s, arrived and shot down a fourth violator. The remaining two violators left the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
AFSOUTH Fact sheets
Banja Luka incident - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I also remember reading about some frustration in NATO due to problems with preventing unauthorised rotary wing activity in the Bosnian NFZ, with authorised RW flights (UN etc.) and the threat of blue-on-blue incidents (especially after the tragedy in Iraq in 1994) adding to the complexity of the mission.
I'm not sure if this carries enough relevance for the Libyan issue, though. Thoughts?