the work (the SB/AD) was in the hands of maintenance
My comments are not directed, specifically, to the present discussion but are somewhat generic -
(a) having, at various times, had backgrounds in several bits of the game - design, manufacture, certification, fleet support (both in the [OEM and operator tech services] design and [operator] maintenance areas), and flying - one of the significant things which has become apparent relates to competent assessment of airworthiness documentation.
(b) we all come to the assessment table wearing glasses which are coloured by our particular skill and experience bases. Furthermore, we all tend to have some difficulty with defining the fence location around the paddock which represents our quantitative expertise. As a consequence, to a greater or lesser extent, a small group (often an individual in a small organisation) may run a higher incidence of interpretative errors than that associated with a larger group covering a wider competence base.
(c) provided the small group is conservative, we get away with the deficiency for much of the time. However, if the documentation is not explicitly clear, the risk of inappropriate interpretation can bite us on the tail.
(d) my view is that a multidisciplinary tech information review process generally will come up with a better assessment decision than that arrived at by the one-man band operation - a bit like the CRM principle that the commander is better served by utilising all pertinent resources during the assessment and management of an emergency/abnormal situation.
Some f'instances -
(a) OEM optional SB provided a comparatively low cost option to retract the landing gear doors following an alternate extension. Standard fit presumed that the (hanging) doors would abrade safely during the subsequent landing.
Operator maintenance organisation was a bit parochial and didn't discuss much with either flight standards or the two Industry engineering consultants retained (of which I was one). Maintenance assessment was that the cost/benefit wasn't warranted so the mod was declined without the knowledge of the other groups.
As Murphy would dictate, the abnormal situation arose but, during the recovery landing, the door decided to depart rather than wear down .. BRT overhaul cost was disproportionately higher than the mod cost ...
The CP, following the event, opined that, had he known of the mod, it would have been incorporated at flight standards direction to guard against just this risk....
(b) OEM parts organisation. Reviewed the warehouse stockholdings and decided that it would be a good accounting idea to scrap everything which had not moved during the past five years. This occurred during a period of several months between the previous fleet support manager's leaving to go to a far more interesting overseas flying task (he is a regular in PPRuNe and a fine chap) and my taking up the reins on a fill-in contract position. Pity that a large number of big ticket items, stocked for a mandatory SB coming up not all that far down the calendar path, were destroyed .. and had to be remanufactured to suit the mod requirements..
In that contract role, due to having to fund the design support but having no effective input into design output, I regularly was faced with enquiries from the fleet operators in respect of confusing aspects of SBs etc. Murphy dictates that the guy in the field will often read something the wrong way (ie not as intended) unless all the i's are dotted and t's crossed in a painstaking way.
(c) in my current day job, one of the sideline tasks is to do the final review of documentation relating to maintenance planning. Not infrequently, I reject documents back to the design group for clarification - they hate me but it comes with the territory.
.. and so it goes on. I'm sure that most here within the nuts and bolts fraternity can come up with a host of additional examples.