The only thing we can do is to fly as safely as we can,follow regulations and when a non standard situation occurs use the best of our knowledge ,preparation and skills with a salt of luck,we may save the day.
... which is akin to the ostrich with its head in the sand.
Either the operator/commander knows what's what, has/have done the sums (forget eyeballing escape procedures - the usual gradients are so low that either they have been analysed prior to the need or one is content to play Russian Roulette - the human brain doesn't appear to be good at calculating gradient intercepts on the fly).
There is no major impediment to doing the thing properly (other than money - I guess some/many operators don't spend on the basis of risk management unless the Regulator holds a gun to their head). Not fundamentally different to a takeoff analysis.
The italicized post, above, is characteristic of the operator with which I would rather not fly, given an alternative. Philosophically, it subscribes to the view that one ought not address any sensible risk mitigation strategy .. prefering, rather, to leave one's outcome to the Fates.
For instance, in previous days at AN, a number of critical runways had been run through the analysis for a missed approach - apart from the money spent, where is the problem ?