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Old 22nd Feb 2011, 23:42
  #1325 (permalink)  
fdr
 
Join Date: Jun 2001
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Inference from photos

Throttle Position Inferences-Limitations


While interesting in relation to the local level of destruction, the photo of the thrust levers is not evidence per se of the thrust commanded at the point of impact. The levers may not be in the position that they were post accident, policing of the accident site is evidently questionable, and they may have been moved. The quadrant has evidently been disassociated from the control system and has been subject to high external forces. As such the other components it may have encountered as the cockpit was destroyed may have repositioned the levers from any commanded position. There are on occasions witness marks that can be identified with the major forces that have been encountered, but they may not have been at the time of initial impact, but later for this part of the airframe. These marks if evident would not be indicated in an overview image as provided.

The evidence of the thrust level will come from the DFDR/QAR/DFDAU, EEC's memory and can be identified from the CVR. These sources can also indicate if a command change was initiated immediately prior to the impact.

Overall, not seeing that the industry knowledge base is going to be qualitatively expanded from this event, the overall event is shaping up as a repeat of operations that have resulted in near misses and accidents in the past on various types, not just Airbus products.

Separately, why the profession and industry allows the operation of such approaches given the historically identified elevated associated risk is perplexing. While I am certain that 411 (no disrespect) can fly a perfect approach like this every day, the industry shows that it doesn't on average cope well, and as a consequence, people die. The industry suffers from the malaise of the lack of appropriate infrastructure for hi capacity RPT operations, and lax operational oversight to ensure that the operations comply with the appropriate restrictions that would be applicable for such pitiful facilitation. This is not a Libya centric issue, this exists in irrational operations at airports such as Zurich, Amsterdam, Sydney, Auckland, Narita, Chicago etc.

Easy to bag the dead pilots for the failures of the regulatory and operational programs that are sitting around the campfire singing "Kumbaya" while next of kin bury the dead. Their problems though, are over, and the risk to the passengers remains due to the lack of investment in infrastructure, (and some poor MMI design...)




regards
fdr is offline