Response to chw.
Blaming the pilot for not understanding the aircraft's MGB pressure system is a disservice to the industry, maybe the presentation on the MFD is the problem .
I don't think you understand, and it has nothing to do with "the industry" being offered a disservice. And it's the lubrication system that the board felt the pilots may not have understood thoroughly enough, not just oil pressure and pumping.
Aside: Your maybe has been addressed in some detail in the report, and in the discussion for the last few pages on this forum. Maybe, and maybe not, on the MFD being where one addresses this problem. If you have not read this thread since its inception, you have missed some bickering, but also some very thoughtful input from experienced pilots on pros and cons of S-92 operations, and over water operations.
The blame for what is presented in the report as pilot unfamiliarity with how the lubrication system works, and thus the estimate of the impact this had on the trouble shooting and decision making by the crew, is a correctly pointed finger at the training manuals and flight manuals, and thus overall the pilot training program that influenced this crew.
Please go up a bit and see where I posted a (roughly) twenty year old warning from the Seahawk NATOPS manual that explicitly points out the wet bulb temp may not be telling you the truth is you lose your oil. I understand from this extended discussion that the Hawk transmissions and the S-92 transmission have that feature in common. Therefore, for this feature of a system to not be addressed in training is either a dumbing down of training, an oversight, or something even worse: an attempt to train helicopter pilots to be Pavlovian dogs (respond to the light!) rather than aviators who know their aircraft inside and out.
I was taught at a very early stage in my flying career that you have to know your aircraft inside and out ... as I began to fly helicopters, that requirement was made with even greater emphasis. Saved me life, it did.
It appears that Cougar spent lots of money on training they're crews so why did the crew lack understanding? Should the SK provide manuals be reviewed.
See above. It isn't the money, per se, it is how it's spent. I have some questions about your familiarity with pilot training. How much experience do you have as an instructor or trainer of aviators?
You Just do not land a Helicopter in the Atlantic with out a clear indication.
I find the less glib explanation of the board superior to your soundbyte, and your "Pavlov's Dog" attitude in re pilots. However, I tend to agree with your general idea that ditching is not to be casually approached, particularly in the dangerous seas confronting that crew. You go from one dangerous situation to another.
The emphases in the report is on survival after a successfully landing on the Atlantic Ocean not on avoiding it.
Really? Given that
the operational environment of that mishap was powerfully influenced by the hostile sea, rather than the calm, warm waters of the Caribbean (for example)
and that
Canada has coastal operations in very dangerous and cold waters,
maybe their investigation into "are we addressing the environmental risks of our operations (collectively)" is precisely what the Canadian aviation community would hope to have them address in some depth ... as well as some of their other points raised in re material and crew issues.
It does you no good to survive the crash and then die in the environment, I think you'll agree. I was taught that rather forecefully in the US Navy training I got.
Is it not that the Crash has been caused by design engineering practice of saving weight at the wrong place ( a few grams), than after the design we load the aircraft up with safety equipment (300.000 gram +) that has not been needed for 30 + years and at the end only saved one person. All other offshore crashes on the east coast did not needed any of the safety equipment other than the raft.
Incoherent, what do you actually mean by this? The person saved is grateful, I am sure, as is his family.
Howe much super cold oil do we need to inject in to the XMSN to keep flying until the helicopter can be landed at a better place than the Atlantic Ocean.
How much weight do you want to add to the transmission deck? Why do you want to refrigerate the oil? How much time have you spent flying helicopters? Your question makes little sense to me.
Is a twin rotor helicopter a inherently safer design, no tail rotor 25 % of power not wasted, power shared by two transmissions , does it have a less critical CG?
Where does your 25% figure come from?
Is it your opinion that no helicopter should have a tail rotor?