David I do not wish to drag out the BAT accident any more than necessary, but a couple of points:
WHAT DIRECTION IS THE WIND, WHERE IS THE FIRE, PUT YOURSELF BETWEEN THE WIND AND THE FIRE SO THE WIND BLOWS THE FIRE AWAY FROM YOU.
The accident occurred in 1985. Since then both BA and the industry in general have learnt a lot about what to do with a take-off malfunction. The SOPs (ACPs) changed as a result of the AAIB findings to line up with your points which are now 'standard'. with, I believe, all operators.
IF the CC on the day had seen the fire, IF they had alerted the FD, IF plane brought to an immediate stop, shut down engines and evacuate had occurred, many lives MAY have been saved.
Not really a good idea - c/crew are trained not to interfere with/distract flight crew during take-off and landing for good reasons, and a 'ding dong' on the call button from the crew would be ignored in an aborted take-off (I've had one during a normal take-off at 'rotate' which was a junior at the back asking if the purser was doing hot towels and getting the wrong button.....). Once the Manchester aircraft had been stopped I understand the crew were well aware of the fire. Yes, it is good (as you say, in Kegworth) to be given information, but there is, as they say, a time and a place and the abort procedures are busy enough without answering a call bell.