@AltCruzGreen - just to clarify - I am NOT suggesting or recommending ignoring SOP's, but I am saying that they are constantly developing, and we should examine events and if there is an application, apply that learning to SOP's. Nor have I (or anyone else that I can see from reading and rereading this whole thread) anywhere advocated allowing CCM's to initiate evacuations at their whim - your choice of emotive language and implying what isn't written is unfortunate.
As regards this comment of yours: "The fact remains that as long as communication is possible, and quite possibly even if it's not, both flight deck crew are always in possession of far more information, and see a far bigger picture, than the CCMs." (tell this to the Kegworth families) how does this sit with M.Mouse's assertion: "It is impossible to see anything behind you from the flight deck of a B737. Unless of course you open the window which would not necessarily have been possible with the engines running (pressurisation issues although I cannot recall the pressurisation schedule in the circumstances they faced) nor would it have even entered most flight crew's minds."
One very recent example: In the recent Qantas A380 incident, after being alerted by the CC, a FD crewmember came aft to have a look at the hole/s in the wing. Clearly the CC knew more about some aspects of the physical damage than the FD crew at that point in time, so much so that the FD crew deemed it prudent to visually inspect.
Then there is a reported case of FD crew shutting down the WRONG engine (Kegworth), when even the humble SLF's looking out the window could see the left engine was the problem. If the FD had consulted the CC to ask if there is any external evidence of damage/fire/smoke they would have been alerted to their error of shutting down the good engine and 47 lives, I believe, would have been saved.
@M.Mouse - I did not say that Manchester had anything to do with CC decisions. Read my post - it clearly says FD crew. I do worry when skilled pilots who have my life in their hands are so fixated that they cannot/do not read accurately or comprehend what they have read. This is what I call the human factors - you are so keen to prove your point that you do not comprehend or maybe do not even read mine. This is an example of the task fixation that happens to people under pressure - be it pressure on you to put a SLF (me) in his place; or pressure on the subject SCCM to get people off the plane as soon as possible because there may be a developing dangerous situation that could get out of control
For the record: my point about Manchester is that it had to do with FD decisions - FD crew following their then acp (accepted company procedure, or SOP's) so that they were possibly blindsided, and did not consider some basics: they believed a tyre had burst (from memory they did not know immediately there was a fire), they braked slowly and exited the runway into the wind, allowing the fire to spread; and this is where I believe they may have been blindsided: the basics when dealing with a spreading fire: WHAT DIRECTION IS THE WIND, WHERE IS THE FIRE, PUT YOURSELF BETWEEN THE WIND AND THE FIRE SO THE WIND BLOWS THE FIRE AWAY FROM YOU. IF the CC on the day had seen the fire, IF they had alerted the FD, IF plane brought to an immediate stop, shut down engines and evacuate had occurred, many lives MAY have been saved.