my point is that the Manchester crew, even though following 'accepted company procedures', did not make the optimal decision (therefore, made a mistake). As you stated, since then "...abandoned take-off procedures changed to include (flight crew) taking into account the prevailing wind in similar circumstances". But in this case following 'accepted company procedures' resulted in many deaths.
I question whether the Manchester crew did nothing wrong - if following 'accepted company procedures' means not evaluating all risk factors and making a decision with a bad (fatal) outcome, is that right or is it wrong?.
Your premise is wrong that the flight crew (because the Manchester disaster was nothing to do with the cabin crew actions, quite the contrary if you cared to read EXACTLY what happened) could have taken any different actions which would have saved the day. Nobody had ever experienced an engine failure causing a fire which was then blown onto the fuselage with such speed and ferocity that the passenegrs and crew could never all get out alive. So how in the world could they have acted any differently?
In this case I side with the SCCM, and I still hold my view: Personally, I prefer the mistake the SCCM made in this instance to the one made at Manchester.
Those people ignorant of the operational aspect of commercial flying will never understand the evolution, importance and necessity to abide by SOPs. Many of which have been developed from accidents involving loss of life.
SCCM mistake - not following 'accepted company procedures' in what turned out to be a non-life threatening situation - outcome: minor injuries to a few, lots of criticism, opportunity to learn and improve practices
All that needed to be learned was to follow her trained, sensible and clear SOPs. i.e. only initiate an evacuation without command in a clearly catastrophic situation.
Manchester mistake - following 'accepted company procedures', not being aware of all risk factors (possibly because of following acp's) - outcome disaster for many
And absolutely no other flight crew would have done anything differently given the circumstances that prevailed that day.
I'm applying my knowledge, training and experience from other fields (decision making under stress, for example - were the Manchester FD crew misled by following acp's so they didn't look outside and asses the risks the acp's didn't consider - like strength and direction of the wind). Also relevant is my burning desire to stay alive.
Again showing your ignorance. It is impossible to see anything behind you from the flight deck of a B737. Unless of course you open the window which would not necessarily have been possible with the engines running (pressurisation issues although I cannot recall the pressurisation schedule in the circumstances they faced) nor would it have even entered most flight crew's minds.
What you and many others are advocating is akin anarchy. SOPs have been developed and refined over many years and with the benefit of experience, often tragic experience. Faced with a situation the subject SCCM faced which was clearly NOT catastrophic which part of the clear SOP did she not understand? If her move was so brilliant then I would expect the SOP to read 'Do not initiate an evacuation without command unless you think you know better than everyone else'.
From my 29 years of flying experience, observation of and conversations with many fine and efficient cabin crew I'll stick with the SOP as written than you.
Using the Manchester disaster as an analogy is a poor choice. Two cabin crew members died alongside the passengers and the other two demonstrated incredible bravery before being forced to flee for their lives. I also believe that Captain Pete Terrington has never fully got over the trauma of that day. I have yet to hear any pilot criticise any of the crew for their actions that day nor claim that they would have done anything differently.
Listen to Stewardess Joanna Caston recounting her experience that day
here.