PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Helicopter crash off the coast of Newfoundland - 18 aboard, March 2009
Old 15th Feb 2011, 16:45
  #906 (permalink)  
Lonewolf_50
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
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To Nick and all the expert out there, can the Aux Tank can be the cause of the titanium failure. Let me explain, the only 2 aircrafts which had studs failure where equipped with the same aux tank. Is it possible the aux tank which is located under the transmission, induce a vibrations that can be the source of the studs break down?
Do you think it would be a freq related to the one per rev or the four per rev vibration?


Transport Canada require that supplemental underwater breathing apparatus be mandatory for all occupants of helicopters involved in overwater flights who are required to wear a Passenger Transportation Suit System.


HEEDS bottles for everyone.

Leads to question: do all Pax on such flights have to show a "I am HEEDS bottle trained" card or be denied passage?

Did HEEDS training in USN a while back ... over a decade ago ... I don't think it's a trivial training cost, depending on if you have to do a full pool exposure or not to meet a training spec.

EDIT to ADD:







In the discussion of MGB malfunctions for the SH-60 family, a SAC product which I flew, there is this WARNING (NATOPS Manual a couple of revs out of date, but probably still there, as it is the same as when I first learned it in the late 80's)
WARNING
• Catastrophic transmission failure will result in loss of helicopter control. Consideration should be given to transiting at minimum power airspeed and a low altitude flight profile (approximately 80 feet and 80 KIAS) to permit a quick flare followed by an immediate landing/ditching.
Operation of the main gearbox with no oil pressure may result in failure of the tail rotor drive takeoff pinion gear and subsequent loss of tail rotor drive.Note
• A loss of all main transmission lubricating oil may result in unreliable temperature indications from the main transmission temperature gauge and temperature sensor (caution light).
Question: do most helicopters have similar language to the above? (EDIT: reloading the page just gave me the second half of the report, so I see analysis of "similar language" on that score.)



I would expect SAC helicopters to have similar language, unless that is some Navese imported from another helicopter type into the SH-60 manual.
EDIT: I just noticed that the training manual does not appear to have made a point in re the NATOPS Note above:
The PTM does not include information regarding how the temperature gauge senses temperature (i.e., that it is a wet bulb requiring immersion in oil) or that it would be unreliable in the event of a total loss of oil, as it would, in such a case, measure ambient temperature inside the MGB case
.

And ...
The RFM makes no mention of how MGB oil temperature will react to a complete loss of lubricating oil (i.e., that it will be unreliable because it measures ambient temperature inside the MGB case)
.

I noted in the narrative of the mishap that for one reason or another, the investigators infer that the crew either did not expect imminent failure ... or as SASless so poignantly put it, they were faced with not just "between Devil and Deep Blue Sea" but also "sea state that may kill us before we get out, and freeze us if we do" as choices available.


Vaya con Dios, amigos.
LAST EDIT: From the report
1.18.6 Social Media
Starting in March 2000, before the S-92A went into commercial use, website visitors engaged in discussions about the introduction of the S-92A. Many of the individuals who posted on this website chose to remain anonymous. However, others such as one of Sikorsky's senior managers for the S-92A program, who was a regular contributor to the online discussion, chose to identify themselves. Over the course of several years, the subject of the S-92A's compliance with Part 29 was discussed at length among members of this internet forum. From these online discussions, it was evident that those involved understood that the S-92A did not have a run dry capability.
It was determined during the TSB investigation that at least one senior manager, and several other pilots at Cougar Helicopters periodically reviewed the material posted on the above mentioned internet forum.
PPRUNE???

Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 15th Feb 2011 at 19:58.
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