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Old 13th Feb 2011, 19:53
  #104 (permalink)  
Heliport
 
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
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Does this all sound like an accurate description of the events?
Rather than speculate, here's the AAIB description of the events:

History of the flight
G-BYAT landed at Glasgow International Airport after an uneventful flight from Funchal, Madeira. Shortly after coming onto stand, after passenger disembarkation had commenced, via door L2, the flight crew became aware of an acrid smell that appeared to be getting stronger. The co﷓pilot left the cockpit briefly, to identify whether the smell was also present in the forward galley; it was and was increasing in intensity, but there was no visible smoke in the cabin. The co-pilot returned to the flight deck and informed the commander, who turned off the APU and the Utility busbars to isolate electrical power to the galleys, before completing the relevant elements of the Smoke Removal checklist from the Quick Reference Handbook. The fire services were then requested via the ATC ground controller. At this stage it was apparent to the flight crew that the smell was dissipating.

At the same time the senior cabin crew member (SCCM) and other cabin crew members were aware of the smell. She went into the flight deck and confirmed with the flight crew that the odour was also apparent there.

The SCCM then returned to the forward cabin and contacted all the crew using the Alert Call on the cabin interphone. They confirmed that there was a pungent burning smell throughout the cabin; there was no smoke, but the smell was strongest in the rear of the aircraft. However, the flight crew did not respond to this call.

The SCCM returned to the flight deck to update the commander, and while the flight crew acknowledged her presence, she did not convey her concerns on the need to evacuate the passengers as the flight crew were busy dealing with the incident. She considered that she needed to disembark the passengers as quickly as possible and so, as there were no steps at the rear of the aircraft, when she returned to the cabin she announced, in a calm manner, over the passenger address system: “Please evacuate the aircraft as quickly as possible. Leave all hand baggage behind.” The cabin crew at the rear doors re-armed their doors and deployed the slides. A total of 43 passengers used the slides, with four of them receiving minor injuries.

Once the cabin crew had checked the cabin was clear of passengers, they were directed off the aircraft, via the airbridge at door L2, by the AFRS who had boarded the aircraft via the airbridge wearing breathing apparatus. The passengers who had evacuated the aircraft were assisted at the foot of the slides by the AFRS and airport personnel.

After the evacuation a number of comments were made by passengers concerning an apparent lack of assistance and direction given to them outside the aircraft. The airfield operator considered this was due to some agencies not being initially informed of the incident. In addition, there were reports of passengers, coming down the slides, colliding with those in the process of leaving the bottom of the slides.
Following the event the operator’s maintenance engineers traced the problem to the right recirculation fan, which was described as “barely running and giving off the burning smell”. The unit was replaced, following which the air conditioning packs and fans were run with no further smell of burning. There was no other damage to the aircraft.
SCCM comments
Following the event, the SCCM commented that the whole incident, from the initial smell to the time of the evacuation, happened very quickly. She added that given similar circumstances, with no rear steps in place and with the very distinct smell of burning in the rear of the aircraft, she would again consider initiating an evacuation.
Operations Manual
Part B of the operator’s Operations Manual includes the following in the section on evacuation drill, dealing with the command for evacuation and leaving the aircraft:
On evacuation command
● In most circumstances the evacuation command will be initiated by the Commander. This will immediately cause the cabin crew to put into action their evacuation drill. If communication is impossible with the pilots and the situation is life-threatening to passengers and crew (e.g. breaking up of the aircraft, an uncontrollable fire in the cabin or ditching), the ICM will initiate the evacuation. However circumstances may also dictate that any cabin crew member initiates the evacuation if faced with a similar situation.”
Leave aircraft
● Cabin crew should leave the aircraft once all passengers have evacuated, or if at any time the area becomes too dangerous to remain inside.
● Cabin crew to take control of groups of passengers and move them away from the aircraft upwind (using megaphones).
● Attempt to keep passengers together.’
Discussion - evacuation
In this particular case, it is clear that the member of the cabin crew who initiated the evacuation was concerned that the situation in the cabin was potentially life threatening. However, the flight crew were not incapacitated and it is evident that verbal communication with them would have been possible had the member of cabin crew persisted.
Safety actions
Following this incident, the aircraft operator issued a Cabin Crew Notice reminding cabin crew of the circumstances when an evacuation can be initiated without it being ordered by the commander, and of the cabin crews’ responsibilities for the evacuated passengers.


[Captain's flying experience: 18,000 hours of which 13,000 were on type.
SCCM's flying experience not stated.]


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