Radken
"Trent 972 pointed out that the A380 FCOM shows “fire” is not one of the sensed FADEC parameters. That makes total sense. I’m sure it’s this way for a very good reason. An engine shut-down decision based on supposed fire is much more in the purview of the skipper than it should ever be as the purview of some remote device, which itself may have been instructed erroneously by any number of other devices, themselves of dubious reliability.... such as fire detect loops. But when called for it'd better work!"
I know Airbus made a statement that they had made changes to the software so this issue was addressed. Just how or what they did they did I don't know. I agree entirely about automation and I have argued a for big red "master off" button elsewhere on this site. I know Airbus have issued statements to encourage a return "to basic flying skills", to always keep up the skill, because I think they too are scared at how much crews rely on the machine.
I don't view Airbus as a culprit in this event. Structurally the wing structure took the missiles very well and there was clearly enough redundancy in the design. The Qantas crew was very confident that the aircraft was doing OK-ish until they could not shut down #1. To me this was the most dangerous part of the event until the passengers were off.
As to the loss of the controls by the missiles: the electrical loom did not cause a fire and there was a circuit some where that could energise the motors that drive the hydraulics. There were five qualified people on the flight deck to work out what the machine was telling them and they were able to sift the chaf from the wheat. They all had previous Airbus experience so knew the basic systems well.
If the escaping fluids had caught fire it would have been a total loss and I would be nowhere near this thread passing opinions. I am not sure it was good fortune though. There is a concept called "the unforseen point load" which will be familiar to civil engineers. Basically this means that at any point on the structure it is subject to improbable events or abuse. I am sure that Airbus had considered and addressed this possibility.
The fact that sparks from the broken wheels did not ignite the fuel was again luck perhaps..but maybe they had chosen a certain alloy for the wheel construction that did not spark so easily. The brakes must have been red hot too.
Looking back, the first thing that came to mind was the way the emergency fire crews dealt with the still running engine, fuel on the floor, hot brakes and rims and 469 souls still on board. It was then that I saw a need for an external stop control. An emergency panel that rescuers could access to shut down the fuel flow.
I agree with the pylon failure yes. That should be easy enough to do. This A380 was designed as a load carrier and as such made some compromises.