RetiredF4:
Sorry to say that, but the thread is again drifting from facts to speculation and assumption.
Eh eh, i dont think so! Considering all hard facts, the scud dive theory is based on strong evidence and not speculations:
1. It has been
officially confirmed (by PAF investigation) that
Jak-40 busted their minimas going below 100m and conducted landing too high above the treshold. Given the absence of technical failures and glidepath guidance by NDB and ATC, this is evidence "e contrario" that they were conducting a "scud" or "rat dive".
2. The Jak-40 pilot informs the TU-154, that there is a cloud base
"well below 50 meters", but in the same breath tells them they should
try by all means to land. Thus
he suggested an approach that would
violate the airport, planes and pilots
minimas. This is evidence for the kind of "esprit de corps" that prevailed in the PAF special regiment. - eg giving a damn about "cumbersome" rules.
3.
Tu-154 were well aware of the limited visibility and the cloud base, that would in
no way allow them to get visual at MDA. Nevertheless, 20 seconds after receiving this information from Jak-40,
they decided to try an approach. This decision would
only make sense if they intended to bust minimas trying to establish visual below the MDA. It is
hardly believable that they expected to have even
a slightly change to get visual at MDA with a cloud base "well below 50m" and "visibility of 200m".
4. It is proven by the FDR and CVR recordings that they didnt call for or conducted a go-around at 120 or even 100m, neither did they get visual ("Voice in cockpit: You can't see a thing"). Instead they kept descending below MDA.
5. They used radar alt from 300m, which was their SOP on Jak-40 in a landing configuration. If they had have had the intention to do an approach by the book, means descending to MDA and then decide on landing they would in now way have used the radar alt. Given the decision to bust minimas, it seems logical for them to use the radar alt, because of - ironically - better ground level seperation indication in a hilly terrain.
6. The last message from Jak-40 ("Visibility now 200") shortly before final didnt lead to any reaction in the cockpit.
They knew that with this visibilty, there is no chance of getting visual at MDA. Nevertheless they continued to final approach, which is evidence that they had plans to do their approach the polish way, busting the MDA (Poles are both known for and proud of their ability to "kombinowac", which means to wangle sth not by the book under difficult circumstances).
7. FDR shows, that as of the
height of 80 meters pull force was applied to the control column two times within 4 seconds, leading to counter push of the still engaged autopilot, because the force was not enough to override it. It is not known if that was done by the PIC or the FO.
There are two possible explanations for this:
a)
An attempt of the FO to conduct a go-around.
Highly unprobable, as go-around thrust was not applied and autopilot not disconnected!
b)
An attempt of the PIC to level out the A/C at an (still safe) altitude of around 50m trying to get visual in horizontal flight. When, 3 seconds after the first pull of the control column, the autopilot pushed back and plane didnt level out, the PIC realized something went wrong and initiated go-around, disconnecting AP and applying go-around thrust.
Quite probable! And also proove that they were actually still aware how to do a go around on this plane!