Some alternative emphasis:
The decision to scrap the Nimrod MRA4 programme was one of the most difficult we had to take.
...as it was fundamentally about saving money, and creating a capability gap with no replacement planned....
The single MRA4 aircraft that had been delivered to the RAF was so riddled with flaws it could not pass its flight tests, it was simply unsafe to fly. I am not prepared to put our service personnel into any plane that isn’t safe.
...technically true, but isn't this a temporary issue, not a permanent one - spin...?!
It would have taken more money and more time to rectify all the problems, if it was possible at all, and the onward cost of sustaining even the reduced fleet over the next ten years was a prohibitive £2bn.
...wasn't the £2Bn just the expected running costs ove 10 years?
So we took the decision not to throw good money after bad. In the final analysis, it had to go......We are having to pay to dispose of the aircraft but this is dwarfed by the projected cost of continuing to blindly pursue it.
....blindly pursue it = pay to support it...?
Labour had already retired the Nimrod MR2 last year before the MRA4 was ready, so the capability has already been gapped for over a year.
.....on the basis that the gap would be short when MRA4 came in, not permanent, and skills fade would be manageable? The skill fade now will be irrecoverable.