Some lessons learned
Hello all; herewith some anecdotal stuff which might be of interest.
The Australian military (not ADF until post-1974) only acquired significant helicopter capabilities in the early 1960s and there was a paucity of civil emergency service helos around the country in those days, as some have mentioned. The RAAF in particular then very frequently became involved in what was termed 'national commitment' tasking, which also embraced support for regional nations such as famine relief and influenza epidemics in PNG.
In our vast continent, flood events are very frequent either side of the Great Dividing Range. The big river systems that flow inland are fed by the annual monsoon and similarly the shorter northern rivers flowing to the coast; and both lots of waterways are impacted by cyclonic storms which vary in frequency and intensity. The southern eastward flowing rivers flood pretty often due to east coast low weather events.
Without tracking back through unit histories, it seemed that Air Force Iroquois became involved in flood relief operations, perhaps around every 2 or 3 years. After the historic 1974 floods, 9SQN based at Amberley was also active again in this role in 1976 or 1977. I recommended several pilots and crewmen for awards for their efforts, which they duly received. Hopefully, there might be appropriate recognition for some of the ADF personnel involved in the recent happening.
Operating lessons always emerge from such situations and herewith mention of some that may have got lost in the mists of time.
When operating over virtual inland seas and in low visibility conditions, navigation can of course become a problem so we included older 'Shell' road maps in the nav bag. They had the locations of service stations marked thereon which usually had a conspicuous oil company logo mounted on a very high pole and these were quite visible in flooded surrounds.
Scene of action co-ordination sometimes became difficult with many emergency services agencies then in their infancy and somewhat 'boy scoutish', so the best person to deal with was the senior local Police Officer. Those guys are very much in touch with their local/regional communities, cool in handling crisis situations and most importantly, have the power to act unilaterally.
A Sea King driver mentioned limited visibility of 800 metres in the recent flood event being a difficulty, but that is okay for helo ops; although rescue hoist activities in driving rain can be tricky which is why some aircrew were decorated for previous efforts. The image illustrates some wet season conditions encountered during Vietnam War operations. Large dead trees poking above the jungle canopy were often very hard to see and my safe operating height for all considerations (in fair or foul weather) was about 100 feet above the foliage or terrain. The tracer at centre frame was I think door-gun suppression.
Command and control has been aired. Years back when exercised at functional command levels (Fleet Headquarters, Field Force Command, RAAF Operational Command) authority to act was appropriately delegated; although going further down the chain, some local 'warlord' base commanders tended to interfere too much in unit responses to their parent command directions. Flying unit executives who were good leaders (and perhaps unambitious) had no qualms about acting unilaterally when appropriate; for example, I recall an occasion at Amberley when a private phone call was received at the squadron advising a nursing sister had been seriously injured in a vehicle accident not far from the base. Nobody hesitated: aircrew bolted out of the crewroom and 9SQN swiftly launched an Iroquois with some Air Force medical people on board. The casualties were very quickly deposited into medical care. Unfortunately, the very popular lady succumbed to brain stem injury.
A potentially big problem I see with ADF organization is the virtual sucking up of much decision-making into Canberra, especially the new Joint Force Headquarters, where even the CDF seems likely to get involved in the tasking of say one piddling C-130. Command should be exercised at the lowest practicable levels, to get the job done efficiently.
Just thoughts that may help foster debate.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 26th Jan 2011 at 00:54.