PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Computers in the cockpit and the safety of aviation
Old 23rd Jan 2011, 18:41
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alf5071h
 
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Peter, raw data or otherwise, those at the front of the aircraft are going to use whatever is presented. Thus as you know, a key aspect of certification is that this data must not be hazardously misleading.
There will, as has been seen throughout aviation history and unfortunately we tend to focus on, the rare exception of low accuracy data (computer ‘glitch’) often resulting in accidents. If we are discussing these then it may be beneficial to look at the complete safety arena, e.g comparing the accident rate from computer problems against overrun accidents – both from a human and technological viewpoint.

However, the debate (as usual) comes from just a few views. Predominantly there is a division between the academic (certification) / engineering view and that of the operating crew.
Many issues are in assumptions originating from these views. The designer/certification engineer may assume a particular level of pilot knowledge and proficiency, whilst the pilot assumes ‘fool proof’, accurate information. Perhaps these are extreme examples, but each view builds up a store of false information or bias about a particular operation. Accidents often originate from these beliefs.
Also it’s the assumed context in which systems operate that can cause problems. An example, yet to be proven, might be the rare, short periods of flight without reliable airspeed. The assumption that pilots can manage with pitch/power has been shown historically to be good enough in a benign context (aircraft type and weather), but in a context of a highly augment aircraft with multiple failures, at night, with an relatively ‘inexperienced’ crew (context), and when penetrating a line of storms, it may be too much to expect.

Even then, there may still be two views; the pilots suggest design/certification action, but design/certification suggests more operator/pilot training.
It matters little in these high level safety debates whether the data is raw or ‘enhanced’; in an emergency the pilot seeks a compromise solution, as no doubt does the design engineer before certification.
Perhaps both fractions require a better understanding of each others viewpoint and capabilities; the resultant educated compromise will benefit safety.
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