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Folks, see these clips for how a (albeit western) PAR approach looks/sounds like:
RetiredF4, I guess you did many like these (probably with a bit higher speed) in your active time, did you?
As i was Instructor- and Checkpilot for the wing, i did a really lot of those in all WX conditions out of the backseat and the frontseat. We used to go to the worst WX for those checkrides to get most training out of it.
A better example of PAR is this
flight-sim-video
Good summary of ATC stuff!
Two points i wish to refresh: There are two different approaches to understand the busting of the minimums:
1. Doing it intentionaly to get the field insight and land.
2. Doing it because of false altitude information (RA from NAV, wrong setup 760 of PF BA, no CRM) followed by incorrect go around procedure in automode. Which means, they had the intention to go around at the Decision altitude of 100 meters, but flew the glidepath down with automode, controlling glidepath with the descent wheel (or whatever it is called) on the account of the wrong radar altitude / PF-BA. Therefore a drop well below glidepath and also a drop below decision altitude happened and was not recognized until too late. The last mentioned points can be found in the MAC report. The CVR the mentioned intention to go around at the minimum and go to the alternate favors this version as well and opposes version Nr. 1.
The role of ATCis to be judged differntly, depending on the above mentioned possible busting reasons.
Generally ATC did not cause the accident, and if the first option applies, there would have been no way to prevent it. You canīt prevent a pilot from flying intentionally into the ground and killing himself and his load of souls.
It looks different in option two. If the crew was unaware of their mistakes and schortcomings concerning altitude above Rwy elevation, ATC did nothing in time to inform the crew about the oncoming problems. The information of ATC did quite the contrary. It gave the aircrew the impression, that they had been on glidepath and on course all the time. So why look in the cockpit and crosscheck instruments, when the information of the NAV, the baro altitude of the PF and the information from ATC draws a picture of "everything is ok".
First abnormal information from ATC was the "101horizon" call, when the Radar-Altitude had decreased already to 45 meters.
The aircraft started 100 meters high on glidepath, the descent rate therefore was nearly double, the speed was fast, it dropped way below glidepath and then below decision altitude and acording to ATC everything looks normal until 45 meters above ground.
That does not fit. If informations are given, they have to be on the spot. The used Radar was not out of order, it was used and few days before checked servicable. If they would have requested an PAR-NDB, they probably would have got it like the Il 76 before. So the only excuse there is, that the crew did not request the PAR and therefore they didnīt get one, therefore ATC is of the hook.
But they could have prevented it or at least they could have taken actions to prevent it, but there are none until 45 meters above ground and therefore too late.
What actions schould ATC have done?
If informations for glidepath are given in an terminology like in an PAR ("on glidepath, on course"), it has to be precise to the possibilities of the system.
- A one hundred meter deviation at glidepath entry shows on the glidepath overlay. Would the crew had been informed about, the next information would be something like "back on glidepath" and therfore a hint for the crew to change descent rate / glideangle.
- Closer in a drop below the glidepath can be observed as well, a information to the crew would have alerted them.
- Range and Glidepath position define the point, where the Go around should take place, a call "approaching minimum, call field in sight or goaround" could have alerted the crew again.
- a perfect controller has a feeling for the timeline and can judge the approach speed of an aircraft, in this case being higher than normal. Our guys used to challenge us if we came in with higher speeds when doing an approach with simulated engine failure and therfore 20 kts higher approach speed than normal.
There is the question wether the controller on the scope really was that good. He might have had a lot of expierience, but did he had enough training in the days before the accident? The equipment plays some role in a PAR approach, but the most decisive element concerning quality for reading and interpreting a non digital radar screen is the human behind the screen. How much PARīs did he give in the last days, month, in the last year and under which WX conditions and for which kind of aircraft? Our controllers had to prove their currency again and again, they had WX- minimas as we did. After leave and therefore out of training, they had not been allowed to control a flight in minimum WX conditions. They first had to get current again in good WX.
As it turned out, ATC was calling out informations which didnīt help the crew at all, those informations might have even been misleading. Therfore my statement, they didnt cause it, but they could have prevented it.
Now comes the MAC report, which states that the glidepath was something off, but within tolerances. And it works with the assumption that the crew has been forced to land and intentionally busted the minimum descent altitude on behalf of general Blasik or other authorities. There is no prove at all that this happened, and therefore it is a very unusual statement in an accident report.
But it is a good approach to screen the deficiencies of ATC and the shortcomings of the place smolensk itself.