It is surely necessary to understand
PBL's and
fdr's papers/commentary/reasoning if one is to advance the safety of the "universe" we, as commercial airline pilots, operate in.
Nothing other than a
rigorous analyses of causal factors will result in a coherent strategy that is able to reduce incidents of a similar nature occuring in the future. It doesn't surprise me (rather it deperesses me) that
PBL's team have found numerous mistakes in the logic contained within a significant proportion of aircraft accident reports.
However, inspite of my pretensions towards academia - PhD in Aerodynamics - I'm not sure it is necessary for me, to, for instance, retain an understanding of all 59 causal factors in the case of AA965 to help me do my job better in future when faced with similar circumstances.
But then my aim in reading the report is not quite the same.
My guess is most pilots will (excepting, perhaps, those who take an interest in contributing to discussions such as this) employ the same "economy of effort" they apply to executing complex tasks whilst airborne to their understanding of complex accident reports. To this end, they will endeavour to distil only one or two significant and salient ideas from the text to inform their modus operandi in future.
Whilst intending no disrespect, I see
RAT's post along these lines. There is nothing rigorous about his commentary. The post serves as an admonition, to others and, perhaps, himself, that deviating from published procedures in the vicinity of high ground, in an unfamiliar location at 400mph comes associated with a degree of risk.
I used to know a pilot who started everyday in the flightdeck by asking the question:
"What don't we know about today that is going to kill us?"
