PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Automation Bogie raises it's head yet again
Old 17th Jan 2011, 21:09
  #143 (permalink)  
aterpster
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DozyWannabe:

I'm pretty sure they were actually using this one (note Rozo identified as R):

http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publ...ep/Cali/c2.gif

Regardless of how you feel about the unwillingness or inability to go raw data when they realised they were confused, the fact also remains that if they had entered "ROZO" into the FMS they would also most likely have come in for a safe landing.
They were indeed filed via airways (W3) to the Cali VOR, followed by the ILS to Runway 01, as you have linked. But, all the discussions with approach control were about instead flying the Rwy 19 procedure, which I linked. (Both charts have ROZO on them).

It's not a matter of how I "feel;" they were obligated to fly the VOR/DME arrival/IAP to Runway 19 once they accepted the clearance. You feel they would have come in for a safe landing had they managed to jury rig the IAP and skirt the margins of the procedure. But, they screwed it up royally. As soon as things got screwed up they had an obligation to either abandoned the VOR/DME Rwy 19, and rejoin the airway at altitude to proceed for the ILS Rwy 1 or, if they were savvy, do the simple task of recovering the Runway 19 approach via raw data. That was a very simple thing to do in a 757.

As to skirting the procedure by going direct to ROZO, they would have been violating this statement on their AAL flight plan (as well as the Colombia AIP procedure):

From the accident report:

AA did however, provide the flightcrew with written terrain information on the flightplan. This noted that: "Critical terrain exists during the descent--Strict adherence to STAR necessary for terrain clearance." The evidence suggests that the flightcrew did not take this information into consideration during the descent into Cali.

Further, the accident report fails to mention whether the accident aircraft was an original FMS (no GPS sensor, just IRUs with DME/DME/VOR update). Because of the date of manufacture of the aircraft, it probably was a first generation FMS. That alone should have prohibit use of LNAV below en route altitudes because of lack of robust DME geometry, which can and has caused serious map shifts in Latin America during those years. Also, although I am uncertain, I suspect Colombia was not WGS84 compliant on the date of the accident.
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