PBL:
RAT 5, I am going to be somewhat more harsh than Dozy Wannabe, because the available information and analysis has been out there, in full view, on the WWW, for some 14 years now.
There is no "tried to". The named manufacturers were responsible for features of their products that demonstrably played a causal role in the accident. You may read about those features in the NSTB letter on the accident to the FAA. A Texas court later found those manufacturers partly responsible, because of the causal factors of the accident contributed by those features of their designs. The courts are, sometimes, able to follow careful causal arguments that don't rely on the gut reactions of casual observers, and pilots everywhere should be grateful for that.
That Texas jury was hoodwinked by deep-pocket-seeking plaintiffs' litigators.
Further, the NTSB has less than a sterling record of objective and competent analysis. And, Cali was not their investigation in any case.
My throat is sore from saying it over and over.
:
These guys were trying to fly a non-LNAV VOR/DME combination arrival/IAP and throwing in an attempt at a short-cut in a non-radar environment. It would have been so easy to:
1. Gone to heading mode and raw data to sort things out.
(I believe AAL policy at the time required that one of them be in raw data mode.) (They finally did go to heading mode, but far too late.)
2. Have stopped a wild, excursion out of protected airspace while continuing a wild-a**ed descent with spoilers extended.
3. The course change was unwarranted on its face.