On the technical details, there were several problems exposed -- but
IGNORED by the NTSB. Note they failed to mention prior cases. Several recent NTSB- P.C.'s (final rpts) demonstrate a lazy-IIC, or misinformed investigator, or lack of any management-oversight: More frequently, even after months & years of investigation, the Board finally releases a poor quality product, worse than a third-world country, & their disregard for detail is of increasing concern. Nothing has changed -- "reconsideration" is NEVER possible (claiming they lack resources to correct blatant errs); and their managers never face any review-checkride, or any investigative "professional-standards" committee.
There are several good thoughts posted above (this thread since the 12th).
SeniorD mentioned:
- "... an inop anti-skid was deferral was possible under the MEL ... that changed post-incident ... no longer deferrable..."
What struck me was that the B737 MEL still offered that permissible-exception to the certificated- configuration -- ANTI-SKID INOP'. This item, anti-skid protection, shouldn't be posted as a permitted-exception (MEL-item) on aircraft with
mass greater than about 80,000 pounds: The human just can't sense "skid" in machines of that mass, and so can't respond to the wheel lock-up. There have been repeated cases (dispatched per MEL or inflight loss of Electrical Bus) which show that the human pilot needs the anti-skid protection to prevent immediate wheel lock-up & tire failure (with any pilot-input to Brakes).
Re' the certificated- configuration, and permissible-exceptions (MEL- Antiskid Inop'), SevenStrokeRoll's COMMENT says it all:
"... where inop anti skid REALLY GETS YOU, is if you reject/ abort a takeoff with anti skid inop...."