PBL:
In my own work I encounter data integrity problems, and their significance for safety-related systems cannot be underestimated. But the problem of assuring integrity seems to be much more difficult than I had heretofore thought it.
I can only speak to the process in the U.S.
1. Survey issues and significant missed obstacles are resolved in initial flight inspection.
2. Source data for government chart-makers and third-party chart-makers is often, but not always, identical.
3. Errors in procedural data notes, such as uncovered in this thread at ASE, are a very weak link in the process, but this affects charts, not databases. And, incorrect or confusing procedural notes tend to create a "primrose path."
4. The FAA itself shows its own doubts about database integrity by requiring a second round of very controlled nav database verification for RNP AR IAPs (the "golden database.") (RNP AR is being terribly overused in the U.S., and well beyond its intended purpose, but that would make for its own thread.)