To clarify an earlier point, my reference to stress / workload management assumes control of surprise and even fearful aspects of encountering situations which might not be believed to be possible, e.g. a pilot who experienced a thrown tyre tread at rotate, experienced cockpit vibration / motion which he could not envisage as being possible or safe for the aircraft; the subsequent actions (land ahead) may have represent the basic fight or flee reaction. These situations involve aspects of knowledge and belief, these also connect with experience - hard facts and projections of existing knowledge, e.g. what conditions an aircraft has been certificated to withstand and continue flight safely.
Avoiding the wrong kind of experience is not always possible. An example (now probably dated by newer training aircraft) where during twin engine training there was significant focus on quickly feathering the prop to maintain control, but in most modern turboprops, hasty action may not be warranted, if required at all where auto feather systems are fitted. Similar training aspects are covered in the PSM+ICR report.
However, this type of experience can be modified by good instruction which would put the need for haste into context – “in this aircraft … because …. but in other aircraft it may not be necessary”. This requires both good instructional technique and a depth of knowledge of the industry; the latter may not be available if ‘junior’ / inexperienced instructors are used.
In this form of instruction the subject is on a broad knowledge base which subsequently can be developed in different areas as the aircraft type changes. Whereas a narrow knowledge base (type-specific training) would need ‘unlearning’ in order to get back to a broad knowledge base or yet another type-specific narrow knowledge base.
Any tendency to revert to ‘first learnt best remembered’ might be tempered by the broader knowledge base; hence teach principles not only the specifics.
PSM+ICR report.