Crab,
Although I do not embark on a blaming of senior officers (whether classed as 'A' or 'B') and can not comment on the career aspirations of those operating at PMA, I do agree with you.
I was merely highlighting that those in charge of the manning levers took it in good faith that the histoical underfunding of of Battlefield Helicopters (as independently recorded in the NAO report and discussed at length on this web site, the open press and many a crew room) was finally being rectified at last by the Prime Minister's announcement of a significant uplift in airframes that would also require a significant uplift in trained personnel (including aircrew).
Irrespective of available airframes or QHIs at the OCUs/OCFs, the SH training pipeline was turned fully on in anticipation of these new aircraft. We all know that the AAC did a pretty good job in bringing AH in, but they did not calculate both the instructor/full training requirement and the shear number of aircrew required (failure and voluntary outflow rate) - hence having aircraft sitting in storage waiting crews to fly them.
If those in charge of the training pipeline had not primed it in anticipation of the 22 wokkas (as well as the already planned upgrade conversions) then we would have been repeating the same mistake.
We all took it on faith in December 2009 that the 22 wokkas were both MoD, HM Treasury and higher echelons of HMG sanctioned.
The fact that the Treasury subsequently squeezed this procurement without any reflection on the obvious strategic requirement for lift (financially blind across all of the future NSC scenarios) is not the fault of those controlling the levers for DHFS and subsequent OCUs/OCFs.