Aterpster, I think that if you reconsider your inference at # 7, that overruns can be avoided by having longer runways, the logic of the argument is flawed.
Whatever the length of runway, and irrespective of the circumstances of it’s location, any aircraft should be able to stop in the distance available as dictated by the calculated landing weight – distance required.
Failure to stop within the required landing distance might arise from a number of sources.
The maligned primary candidate – human (pilot) error is in part considered in the calculations by provision of a distance safety margin (distance factor).
Aspects of technical failure might be encompassed by excluding reverse on the landing calculations, yet is available for most landings.
From the scant information so far, the perennial poor weather / runway conditions appear to be factors, which in turn could include poor communication to the crew – they didn’t know (but perhaps reasonably could have taken precautions).
More likely are factors of organisation:-
The FAA does not mandate the use of contaminated runway landing performance, although many operators do have and use suitable data. However, there could be many misunderstandings in its use (cf Midway), not least the FAA recommendation to use a 15 % factor which might only cover distance errors in planning and data assumption, resulting in no distance safety margin at all, and thus the need for full reverse, max braking and a ‘fair wind.
Let’s not prejudge the situation by suggesting problems and solutions, but with hindsight assessing similar events, the ‘accident’ probably commenced much earlier in the flight with information, assessment, judgement, and decision making which all came together at the runway location.
Additional length, safety areas, systems etc, only mitigate something which commenced much earlier. If these issues reoccur, ’such events happen periodically - 20 in 36 months !!!’, then this was an accident waiting to happen.