High Level Failings?
I don’t recognise the comments regarding a campaign amongst the high priced help to play down airworthiness issues from about 1987 or so, as stated by tu.
In the Spring of 1990 I set up and then ran for 4 years, the Support Authority (now Integrated Project Team) for a front line jet. As I was not an aero systems (AS) engineer, there was real concern – and not a little bigotry – about why an outsider was doing this and a major issue was air worthiness authority and responsibility; not necessarily the same thing. I was fortunate to work for an engineer two star who took the trouble to discuss the issues with me and to ensure I understood the overriding importance of the subject. The outcome was that I held air worthiness responsibility for ‘my’ aircraft weapon system and my senior AS engineer, the authority.
At this time, the engineers were looking at the implications of licensing RAF engineers to ensure the highest standards of professional competence and the issue of ‘letters of delegation’ were also considered but I believe there were much wider issues and I do not believe licensing ever came about ( I stand to be corrected).
On my jet, I had a budget to run the full test specimen, contracts for advice on structural integrity, ageing aircraft surveys, consultation on a raft of other issues; such as corrosion, fatigue problems, ‘sampling’ of components and ad hoc advice on many matters. There was a team of six experts – all highly skilled and exceptionally well motivated – technicians who examined all proposals to do anything with the aircraft. There were ‘open channels’ to Boscombe Down, industry and AAIB, as well as CSDE Swanton Morley. Maintenance technologies, allowed for revisions to the maintenance cycles but at every turn, the red line was safety and integrity.
The consolidation of the Desert Storm ‘enhancements’ was also pursued in a sensible and safe way and the management of the initiation and re-approval of special trials fits (STFs) was thorough.
At no time during my tenure of office was there any pressure to short cut the system or to compromise on safety and – when I added another aircraft type to my little fiefdom – my insistence that a more elaborate set of remedial actions were implemented to solve a problem, than had at first been proposed, were accepted at 2 star level without demur.
The principal RAF engineer officers on whom air worthiness responsibilities rested would not, I believe, have countenanced any sort of slipshod approach to safety and if there is evidence to the contrary in the period in question, perhaps it should be exposed by those whose view of these matters is higher than my own.