IGh;
Re your comment, "Note the manufacturer fails to mention lessons from the FSF's ALAR Task Force (ALAR Briefing Note 4.2 "Energy Management"), nor any mention of the FAA's "engines spooled-up" requirement imposed upon Part 121 pilots: which requires line-pilots to deploy sufficient DRAG early in the approach, so as to attain "engines spooled-up" PRIOR TO the 1000' IMC approach Gate.", and "operator's management advice"
Well stated. However, the industry continues its primary economic focus even as both the flight data and the overrun accident data as well as the regs dictate otherwise.
The current "advice" almost always offered in airline work in terms of approach power is, "Thrust utilized to maintain target airspeed". This advice leaves open the opportunity to use idle thrust in order "to maintain target airspeed". Is this kind of waffling statement for fuel saving, plausible deniability, leaving the crew to manage their airplane or facilitating the risk of an overrun? The answer lies in examining the overrun accidents themselves and not in economically-driven operations procedures. The admonition, seen in some quarters, to maintain thrust "above idle" is not much better, permitting, for example on the CFM56, a setting of 45%N1 +/-, which is arguably just above idle. Still, industry data which continues to show crossing the fence at 25kts above Vref and landing long, all under idle thrust begs for answers, does it not?
So, are the FAA Pt 121 and ALAR Briefing Notes satisfied? Hopefully the report, as you say, will comment on this. Boeing's and Airbus' economic case for saving 60lbs of fuel in some circumstances, has yet to be made. The ATSB's report on the QANTAS B747 overrun at BKK was clear, saying their accident "was in their FOQA data" many months before it occurred.
PJ2