The latest release from the investigating authority, JCAA, is available:
THE JAMAICA CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY
JCAA release #3 is a pdf, 6pgs, 84KB download [click on the news, UPDATE, right side menu].
Still no explicit statement from JCAA to confirm the LANDING CONFIGURATION for this tailwind approach to a wet rwy.
As described in message #304 (this PPRuNe thread) dated 7Jan2010, JCAA's stated Vref
implies FLAPS-30 (Lower-Drag) configuration for approach & landing [NOT F40].
Manufacturer's latest advice toward that Lower-Drag Approach config' [reduced-flap, delayed-flap, or low-drag approach procedures] is available here:
AERO - Conservation Strategies: Descent and Approach
Note the manufacturer fails to mention lessons from the FSF's ALAR Task Force (ALAR Briefing Note 4.2 "Energy Management"), nor any mention of the FAA's
"engines spooled-up" requirement imposed upon Part 121 pilots: which requires line-pilots to deploy
sufficient DRAG early in the approach, so as to attain
"engines spooled-up" PRIOR TO the
1000' IMC approach Gate.
If AA331/ 22Dec09 did fly that tailwind-approach with the
Lower-Drag FLAPS 30 configuration [not Flaps 40], then both the operator's
management advice, and the
manufacturer's advice, should be reflected in the investigation findings, & PROBABLE CAUSE statement. Was the lower-cost, Flaps 30 configuration regarded as the company's "standard" for those mishap-pilots?