DZ - We are at the "Houston, we have a problem" stage with F-35.
One immediate issue is that, for not well explained reasons, the program is slipping in flight test, aircraft delivery and (according to the SecDef's flack) software development, all of which are later than anyone thought they were in March. Somewhere along the line, people haven't been telling the boss about the problems.
Another is cost. If the jet does not come down the learning curve as planned, a lot of international partners will watch their affordable force decline through the 30-40 aircraft mark. The USAF won't be able to afford 80 jets a year. Where do costs and numbers settle out?
A lot of money has been spent, true - but much more remains to be spent, in production and operations and support. The B is going to be very costly to maintain, with a lower engine life and lots of hot moving parts - but if we take that out where does it leave us? What's the operational penalty of an F-35A and F-35C that are variants of the STOVL aircraft (they would be very different if there were no B, with two engines, longer and leaner)? The comparison of the C, for example, with a Super Rhino is not the slam-dunk affair that the Fort Worth PowerPoint Rangers would have you believe.
Just my 38 trillion cents worth...