(BTW, I expressly disagree with Mike7777777's analogy of the Concorde accident with Chernobyl, Piper Alpha, and Deep Water Horizon. Those all involved multiple instances of direct mistakes, and pervasively poor safety practice. Whereas the only action that could remotely be called poor practice in the Concorde incident was Continental's repair.)
Question of degree, that is all. Simplistically, could the failure have been averted by adherence to documented procedures? I'm very aware that "by the book" has many critics, and where the hazard to others is minimal then let them get on with it, but the ramifications of catastrophic failure for complex systems can be substantial; the UK potentially faces an electricity generating capacity crisis 2015ish onwards, a primary factor being the failure to enlarge the civilian nuclear power programme, partially as a result of the Chernobyl incident (other factors also apply).
In my experience (working alongside
TÜV), the Teutonic approach is very prescriptive with insufficient reference to risk analysis, particularly condition based maintenance, although this is changing.
AFAIK, the Deepwater investigation is continuing.