SLAST
I spent three days researching the testimonies in the BA museum and made a FOI request to the AAIB.
I have written a biography but due to advice from counsel have put publishing it on hold.
Cunningham's testimony I have read in full and there is a reference to him in the accident report.
As has been pointed out we flew a different noise abatement procedure than that recommended by Davies who was the ARB test pilot , it is in handling the big jets.
There is also a file on his testimony which I do believe is not mentioned in the official report. I missed reading this which I regret and at the time I didn't understand the significance that he isn't mentioned in the report.
The report states that there was a baulk (or interlock) fitted between the levers as there was a theory put forward that if the down selection wasn't made correctly then the droop could automatically move when the flap lever is selected up .
I remember playing with the levers with the engines off and realised it was balderdash - the theory is in the report.
There are several opt out clauses on FOI which the AAIB used after they had retrieved the files for me.
Two important questions they couldn't answer under these constraints, one was whether my letter about our training had been submitted by FM to the inquiry.
But I had a very interesting conversation from one of the accident inspectors.
The main points of this conversation for this forum were his distancing himself and the AAIB from the inquiry conclusions and that the simulator flying characteristics were markedly different those of the aircraft.
The other interesting testimonies were George Childs who had quizzed me on what to do with a stall warning and had tried to get management to introduce a correct stall recovery procedure, Evans, Holloway and one training captain who said he had interviewed numerous co pilots who, to a man, had recounted a stall recovery procedure which was rather different to that which I had been taught and was in my flying procedures - those of us on the fleet at the time will know what I am getting at.
Hobo
Sorry I will not go into much detail on the forum but somewhere in the inquiry report it says words to the effect that co pilots were provided to ASSIST the Captain as the Trident was to complicated to be operated by one pilot.
Contrary to what was stated in equally sharing the flying, I achieved around one leg in five and when I was initially P2 only I flew EIGHTEEN sectors RHS without being allowed to attempt a landing.
And if you really want to look at the BEA field of influence - I joined the week the Vanguard dug a hole near Ghent - this was followed by another six or seven aircraft in my 6 years in BEA.
All bar one were 100% our fault - except for Zagreb although the report stated that if the crew had looked out then the accident might have been avoided.
Other prangs were the viscount flew into cloud wiv hard centre.
Cyprus T2 - low slow during training - became XM.
Two 707s .
Bilbao 1E.
I left BEA in 1978, the accidents didn't initially - so it wasn't my fault your honour.
BOAC didn't destroy anything during this period.
I owe a huge amount to some of the ex national service pilots and Hamsters on the Trident and without their nurturing I would have never successfully completed my transition on the Iron Duck.
Last edited by blind pew; 16th Dec 2010 at 21:08.