If you do a little study on how planes are flight tested for RTOs, it's pretty much Joe Test Pilot accelerating up and down the runway to V1, then applying brakes.....then recording the distance data, checking the brakes for issues ect.
.. from which we can infer that such testing is not in your background ?
do you really think that if your brakes are certified to be 100% reliable to brake from V1, at Max Gross Weight ...that another 5kts or so is going to be the difference in your brakes failing?
.. one might consider brake capability as being a bit like a bucket of money. When you go for the RTO (and we are looking at a critical case here - GW, OAT, wind, slope, etc - clearly, the further away from the critical situation one might be, the better the situation) you start throwing out (large) handfuls of money. When the bucket is empty, it's all over. What the line pilot doesn't know, however, are the real margins inherent in the specific certification.
Point is, if one operates outside the Book, then one is venturing into no-man's land .. the statistical basis for certification provides a measure of protection for the operator and crew (and, by their being glued to the cockpit, the passengers). Outside those boundaries, the pilot (or other relevant person, eg maintainer for maintenance actions) carries a burden of having to justify his/her decisions after the event - I draw the reader's attention to any of a vast number of legal proceedings .. the Air France Concorde outcome in recent days makes for interesting thoughts ?
the proper way to discuss your end is talk about distance, not brake failure, and why so many of you are throwing out your margins with assumed power/derated take offs.
Two different considerations albeit with some linkage in terms of risk.
To talk distance is fine .. but, if the brakes have quit ... that extra distance might not be enough on the day.
For those who might take issue with Johns7022's views, the importance is that such views challenge the conventions and lead to vigorous and robust discussion .. all of which should be useful for Tech Log's educational interests.
Whether he might be right or wrong is not the point ..
If you are taking off into a headwind of 30 kts and the aircraft V1 is based on braking ability, or runway length, then surely rejecting at 10 kts beyond V1 should cause no problem as the groundspeed is (in this case) 5 kts below the V1 that the graphs have produced.
One presumes that you have the data and engineering know-how to justify such an action after the event ?
Point in question is
(a) if things are reasonably "normal", one probably is better served by sticking to the certification paddock as prescribed and described in the OEM AFM and similar documents. Well thought out SOPs provide some measure of protection after the event as well as sound risk management strategies for normal and defined abnormal/emergency situations..
Any suggestion purporting, routinely, to operate outside the norm is somewhere between very stupid and unbelievably stupid.
(b) if things go decidedly pear shaped and out of left field during the flight, then the Commander gets to earn his/her big bucks at the time. The outcome will involve consideration of knowledge (general technical and specific event-related), skill, a measure of luck .. and a bunch of other matters relevant to the specific event
Whether such decisions might cause difficulty and heartache at the subsequent enquiry is a moot point.
One needs to keep in mind that 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful thing, greatly admired by the legal fraternity, and has hung more than a few crews out to dry after the event in which they had barely a couple of seconds to make a critical, usually non-briefed, call ...