While there may be 'nothing new', a number of things struck me.
- There is no mention of anything like
- 'if both aircraft had been transponder equipped the Short Term Conflict Warning would have altered the controllers to the collision risk', which would suggest this does not exist with regard to ATM displays
- 'If G-BOLZ had a Mode-C or better transponder then G-EYES's TCAS would have prevented the collision'. Sadly even if both aircraft were Mode-S equipped, due to the lack of airborne traffic detection in either aircraft, it appears transponders would not have helped in this particular accident chain.
Demonstrating that we still are in a world where technology is only a partial aid not a total answer.
- The clear misunderstanding between pilot and controller about what flight rules G-EYES was operating under, and what protection the flight rule choice might or might not provide.
- More generally, there may be a view among some pilots that being IFR means one has a higher priority and does not need to look for traffic in VMC (something I see implied in some posts)
- The lack of clarity if a Tower or Approach Controller, is actually 'controlling' VFR aircraft. Until reading the report, if I was instructed to 'continue through the localiser and establish right base', I would not have considered the possibility someone else sequenced behind me on the ILS would be about to T-Bone me
- The practical impossibility of seeing smaller aircraft (even the PA-28) in anything like adequate time at 160knots (let alone the maximum 250 knots that is allowed down low)
The challenges of mixing fast and small aircraft are clear, however, it is achievable with a high level of safety as demonstrated everyday in many airports throughout the world (particularly in the US). Sadly in this case, too many links in the accident chain lined up.