The captain called “reject” 1.3 sec after the loss of power and initiated the associated action 0.8 sec later by retarding the power levers to idle as the aircraft was accelerating through 172 kt 7,300 ft along the runway. The flight engineer, noting that lights indicating that the thrust reversers were deploying had not come on, called "No reverse" and immediately moved the spoiler handle back. As a result, the spoilers were deployed and the autobrake system activated. At this point, the aircraft had accelerated to 175 kt and was 7,850 ft down of the runway, and 3,150 ft from the end.
Reverse thrust power was applied as the aircraft was decelerating through 140 kt, 1,850 ft from the end of the runway.
The autobrake began applying pressure 1.8 sec after the captain pulled the power levers back to idle. This activation of the autobrake was the direct result of the flight engineer manually deploying the spoilers when he noted the thrust reversers had not been selected. The thrust reversers were not deployed until 3.5 sec after the power levers were retarded. The brake pedals were not used by the crew during the rejected takeoff.
Although the Abnormal Procedures checklist current at the time of the accident did not call for immediate manual activation of the spoilers, the flight engineer’s actions to do so, in accordance with airline standard operating procedures (SOPs), greatly reduced the amount of overrun. The engine maintenance records indicated that the three engines on the aircraft had been maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations;