BOAC
I am very disappointed with you especially given your pedigree where have your balls gone?
Can you not resist the group think that has so constrained debate here?
Do not think emotionally like women work through things rationally, like men used to do.
Let us go through your emotional responses see the elephant in the room and deal with it:
<<...a crew would not sense something was wrong from visual cues, abort the mission and report back...>>
have I been somewhat too subtle about my descriptions of that localised weather, visual illusion, spatial orientation, my humble opinion after years of coastal navigation and being particularly familiar with the NW of Scotland from sea and air and hill top? - has something stopped you from calling my bluff when I suggested some years back that anyone interested in this case should go up there in the summer and, late in the afternoon to early evening, with a southerly blowing (most of the time, it's the prevailing wind there) you'd get the chance to witness those all so common conditions if you cant afford a plane, just go out in a boat.
The lack of visual cues as they approached closely is the crux of the matter.
Those conditions that day would have been predictable with a forecast a few days ahead so much so that they could have been counted on weeks ahead, they could have been expected, at that time of day, at that time of year.
<<the weather would provide EXACTLY the right orographic cloud at exactly the right time>>
The orographic cloud, so common there, did not have to be exactly right it just had to obscure the higher topographical features as it so often does the subtlety is the ground hugging mist running up slopes that are devoid of recognisable features with a strong wind, that develops hundreds of feet below the start of the oro cloud as I have described previously and have posted links to a video I took of its formation.
<<the crew would have pressed on at cruise speed towards a 'murky Mull' relying solely on a reading fed into some black box by persons unknown.>>
Chinooks can stop on a sixpence, so 150 kts should be viewed in context but yes, one would have expected prudence without any local guidance which is why I originally predicted some source of DME. The PRC112 is intrinsically reliable and very accurate, well used by that time by several countries. If you were flying VFR and something was giving you a measurement that you expected to be accurate, then you should have expected to stay out of contact with the mist the American unit based at Macrihanish at the time would have been well versed in the use of the ground equipment and willing to help out their friends a special relationship that needs lots of Preparation H.
<<Ask yourself also who tasked it? Who authorised it?>>
Well we would all like to know these things have you (collectively speaking want to pitch it right) accepted for 16 years the spin we have had that Flt Lt Tapper (by all accounts a conservative and responsible officer up until this point) pushed himself for this sortie, shortcutting authorisation, briefing, communication in general, and flouting common sense? he simply had to have had support for this sortie from higher up that has thus far not been acknowledged by the RAF.
<<... the 'probabilities' of 'getting away' with such... >> it was a free shot with a better than 50% chance of success doubtless there would have been a messier plan B.
<<... known sympathies for the IRA amongst our US 'friends'... .>> are you aware of how much the powers-that-be in London wanted to wash their hands of the NI problem? Even the PM and cabinet ministers publicly expressed the view that they wished NI would just go away but this team on board that helicopter that day were not enthusiastic about the proposed peace process, did not think concessions to terrorists were necessary, and had they got to Ft George they would have set in motion their plans for a hard line, including mass round-ups the bargaining position of the IRA would have been weakened but, more importantly for our internationalist political leaders, two of the last nationalist enclaves in Europe (Ulster and Ireland) would continue. So perhaps the scale of action and capability of potential perpetrators could be greater than the odd sympathiser.
<<
the gross injustice dealt to the deceased crew ... >> what superlative would you ascribe to the verdict if at the very least an exercise went wrong that had not even been disclosed and it was another party's fault? - further, what would be left in your vocabulary if the action had been wilful and organised?
Goes beyond words, doesn't it?