Thanks for pointing that out Lonewolf.
Glad to be of some small use.
The engineer in me remains interested as well.
This crash has just been haunting and puzzling me ever since it happened and the engineer in me really wants to understand what might have happened.
As this thread shows, you are not alone.
What I was trying to ask is what this accident could mean for the Boeing vs. Airbus flight control philosophy if it turns out that the computer stalled the aircraft.
Given that both design philosophies, in the greater scheme of things, work well enough I don't think AF 447 is a test case for "all or nothing" "one or the other" arguments at the systems design level.
A number of experienced AIRBUS drivers, in this thread and others, have pointed out how to handle that kind of aircraft in Direct Law, Alternate Law, and various systems degraded modes ... and still keep the bird flying.
That said, I confess to being a non-fan of over-automation. That isn't necessarily an FBW problem. From my experience with military aircraft, some primative and some with much of automation, the problem comes at the crew-system interface. You really have to know your system, exercise that knowledge, and keep up with all of the little technical changes and nuances. Quite literally, your life and that of your passengers/crew depends upon a detailed and deep grasp of your entire aircraft systems package. As aircraft get more complex, systems-wise, the demand for this knowledge goes up, not down. As automation increases and FE's are no longer crew members, the systems knowledge requirement on the cockpit crew is (as I see it) increased.
What concerns many professional pilots is both the unknown bugs in automated control systems, and where both known and unknown points of failure in a system are.
The latter strikes me as the key driver to finding AF 447s FDR and CVR.
- What the heck was going on in those last doomed minutes?
- What actually went wrong?
- What actually wasn't working as advertised?
- Why wasn't the upset, whatever it was, recoverable?
If Airbus and various regulating agencies and airlines guess WRONG on what went wrong, then whatever fix is agreed can't prevent the next upset from a similar cause resulting in similar tragedy. **
That prospect bugs me, even though I rarely fly (separate issue) as a passenger anymore. I would hate to see AF 447 repeated because the system wasn't sure of what to fix.
@ DERG
They have not got a hope in hell of finding the pitot tube.
You may be right.
They do have a hope in hell of avoiding the issue that faults were know and not addressed promptly.
Without data, the system can guess, at best. See my point above, the one with ** at the end.
Some of you guys are obsessed with bodies and body parts. refocus you minds on the pitot issues.
You are assuming a solution in absence of data. That doesn't answer the questions required to put proper remedy in place for this mishap's causal factors.
All this serach will do will prolong the litigation by Air France and the relatives through the courts. I find this morbid discussion offensive.
So what?
Just because lawyers and lawsuits are a tasteless feature of modern life does not mean that problem solving should not go on. You can't hope to find the boxes if you can't figure out where the plane actually hit the water, which is still an unknown. Hence, the discussion of drift patterns to establish one or more datum from which to search for the last bits of AF 447.
Not sure your "blinders on" approach is how the industry ought to proceed, sir.