The tail codes are Station and Squadron specific and selected by the engineers when the aircraft arrives on the sqn. In the old days, each sqn used single letters so each sqn had an "A", "B" etc. Traditionally in those days the two stick pilot trainer on many F4 squadrons was designated "Z".
Starting with the F3 force the system changed slightly although it had been used before on other fleets. The tail letters became double letters with each initial letter designating the squadron. The OCU was A, 29 Sqn B and 5 Sqn C. The codes thus became AA, BA, CA etc.
One of the exceptions was 229 OCU/56 Sqn where we had more than 26 aircraft at one point as the F3 replaced the F2. After "AZ", briefly we had as high as "A7".
At Leeming the codes were D for 11 Sqn, E for 23 Sqn and F for 25 Sqn and at Leuchars, G for 43 Sqn and H for 111.
Invariably, when a jet left the sqn it went to the MU for major servicing. Sometimes it returned and would keep its code but often it would be sent to another sqn and pick up a local code.
The F3 was a much maligned beast and the As the aircraft is effectively out of service I'm not giving much away at this stage. I'll be honest, in the early 80s none of us wanted it and a two seat F15 or the F14 would have been our preference. The reality was that we were going to get a "British" product but, despite that, the requirement was myopic so my remarks are made in that context.
It turned the corner with the introduction of the Stage 1 radar in the early 90s. That gave it a very capable radar and coincided with the introduction of JTIDS which gave a quantum leap in situation awareness. About the same time we fitted defensive aids which improved self defence. Unfortunately, integral designs for the TRD were unaffordable and the podded version needed a Phimat chaff dispenser on the other wing as a balance for the flight control system. This added weight and cost perfomance at height. Ironically, this coincided with the trend towards operations at medium levels which forced the fighters even higher. Up to that point, it would have coped at lower levels where the aircraft was typically employed.
The story of the jet was late development or lack of development. The aircraft entered service in 85 with a radar that didn't work. "Blue Circle" was a reality but contrary to popular belief, the ballast was only fitted for about 6 months until the "Y List" radars arrived. It took 5 years to reach an acceptable standard during which time the myths were rampant. The concept was always to fit JTIDS but from early in its life it was obvious that it needed AMRAAM and ASRAAM. It took until the Combat Sustainability programme in the late 90s before the MOD could be persuaded to invest. Even then, the AMRAAM fit was rejected, deferred, introduced in austere form before finally fitting the full capability everyone knew was needed from the outset. In my opinion, it took almost 12 years to get the aircraft to the maturity it should have enjoyed at ISD. Delays inevitably cost more money.
Operationally, serious mods were needed to deploy in GW1. The baseline defensive aids fit had been delayed so interim devices were fitted under urgent operational requirements and we only formally qualified some GW mods (at great cost) in 94/95. Sadly, the reputation with the Americans was such that the jet was only employed as back stop CAP. With the lack of any credible attacks against the rear area, the aircraft rarely got into a position to engage. This still haunts the crews with unfair criticism which is posted in every F3 thread. The F3 would have given any of the Iraqi threats as good as it got. Leave aside the airframe restrictions of a high wing loader, operating at a height above its best environment but with a Stage 2 radar, AMRAAM, ASRAAM and defensive aids, the F3 crew had a situation awareness on a par with any combat airframe until the advent of Gen 5 fighters.
Without going into it, the aircraft also had a few tricks up its sleeve which would have helped employ the weapons more effectively.
The EF3 was a capable SEAD platform and but for in house bickering could have been an extremely effective escort platform. Sadly, the leadership were never convinced or saw it as a threat to other platforms IMHO.
The sad side was that many of the potential enhancements were never funded. Imagine the aircraft with a helmet mounted sight and a capable close in weapon such as ASRAAM. If an integral jammer had been fitted which was technically possible, the weight and drag of the external loads may have been avoided making the aiframe more employable. Imagine an EF3 fitted with external jamming pods with a support jamming/escort role and a training capability. Technically feasible but insufficient funding.
All in, the F3 was much more capable than its reputation and properly developed would have held its own. That said, it was designed for the North Sea fight so it was never going to be a good a high level fighter. It did many things well but, without HMS, should not have been placed in a situation where it was threatened in a turning fight.
As always, JMHO.
Last edited by Geehovah; 3rd Dec 2010 at 06:46.